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DEROLPH V. STATE AND OHIO's LONG ROAD TO AN

ADEQUATE EDUCATION

Larry J. Obhof
Ohio's experience with school finance litigation has in many ways
paralleled the trends in such litigation nationwide. The 1990s saw a shift
in the focus of school finance litigation from "equity" to "adequacy." In
contrast to earlier school finance cases, which focused on reducing
spending disparities, the adequacy approach concentrates on the
sufficiency of school funding. 1 Plaintiffs in these cases seek to invalidate
school finance systems not because of funding disparities per se, but
rather because the quality of education provided in some districts fails to
meet a perceived constitutionally required minimum standard. 2 Plaintiffs
in adequacy-based suits have generally been more successful than those
in the earlier equity-based suits, and have won eleven of twenty-two
cases. 3 Additionally, courts in several states that had previously rejected
challenges to their school finance systems have abated and, under the
burgeoning adequacy standard, found their states' systems
unconstitutional. 4 Ohio is one such state.
On December 19, 1991, a coalition of five Ohio school districts and
various individuals filed a complaint in the Perry County Court of

·Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL; ).D., Yale Law School; B.A., Ohio State University. The
author wishes to thank Professor jim Ryan and all of the participants in his School Finance.Litigation
Seminar at Yale for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. A special thanks is owed to all of
the policymakers and other individuals who granted interviews or otherwise provided background
information for the article. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of Kirkland & Ellis LLP or its clients.
1. Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance,
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 281, 293
(1998) (reprinted in Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 1019 (3d ed.,
LEXIS 1999)).
2.

Id.

3. james E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.). 249, 269 (1999).
4. See also Paula). Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty State Analysis, 63 Alb.
L. Rev. 1101, 1103-04 (2000) (stating that supreme courts in two states-Arizona and Ohiooriginally declined to overturn their school funding systems, but later overruled these decisions and
found their systems unconstitutional); Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are
Some Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 1147, 1149 n. 12 (2000) (noting
that among the states that have held their systems unconstitutional, "[t]he Arizona, Ohio, and
Washington high courts have also previously upheld their respective state's financing schemes").
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Common Pleas, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, including a
determination that Ohio's public school tlnancing system was
unconstitutional. 5 In doing so, the plaintiffs joined a nationwide
movement to improve the conditions of public schools and reinvigorated
a dormant debate in Ohio over the constitutionality of the State's funding
scheme. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs,
and on several occasions it held that the State's funding system was not
"thorough and efficient" and therefore did not meet constitutional
muster. Thirteen years and four Ohio Supreme Court rulings later, the
legal battles may be over, at least for now. The plaintiffs' struggle for
greater and more adequate school funding, however, looks as though it
will continue. 6
The series of cases collectively known as DeRolph v. State is
important for a number of reasons. Most importantly, of course, is the
fact that the DeRolph cases were the impetus for signitlcant changes to
Ohio's school finance system-changes that would inevitably affect the
present and future prospects of students throughout the State. The
DeRolph saga is also signitlcant because it illustrates important themes in
school tlnance litigation. First, DeRolph demonstrates the shift from
equity-based to adequacy-based litigation strategies. Ohio's experience
with both DeRolph and prior litigation helps illustrate the perceived
weaknesses of the equity approach and the relative strengths of the
adequacy approach, even within the salhe system. The cases, and the
responses to the Ohio Supreme Court's decisions, also illustrate some of
the pitfalls facing courts that engage in judicial activism.
The DeRolph plaintiffs sued under both equity-based and adequacybased theories, but they consistently eschewed the leveling-down
approach seen in some of the early equity cases. Indeed, plaintiffs' own
statements explicitly rejected leveling-down as a remedy. "The mission
[of the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding] ... is
to secure high quality educational opportunities for all school children.
The Coalition adamantly supports the strategy of leveling up the system
without taking resources away from the districts with stronger tax
bases." 7 The Ohio Supreme Court, furthermore, accepted only the
adequacy-based theory arising under Ohio's Education Clause, ignoring
plaintiffs' equal protection challenges. Indeed, both the plaintiffs' strategy
and the Ohio Supreme Court's response represented a sea-change from

5.

DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733,734 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter DcRolph I[.

6. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, Executive Director of Ohio Coalition fc1r Equity
& Adequacy nfSchooll'unding (May 2, 2003).
7.

lvlission Statement o( Ohio Coalition Ji>r Equitv & Adequacy of School Funding, availa/Jlc at

http://www.ohiocmllition.org (accessed Jan. 10, 2005).
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the equity-based approach, which hampered earlier reform efforts in
states such as California.
The controversy surrounding the judicial activism in the DeRolph
cases and the political backlash that followed illustrate the highly
polarized nature of school finance cases, particularly in states where
judges face elections. The Ohio Supreme Court's decisions were greeted
with proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over school funding
cases, 8 ignore the Court's orders, 9 or even to impeach one or more of the
justices. 10 A concurrence to one of the decisions discussed the possibility
of holding the legislature in contempt, 11 and some non-governmental
organizations advocated putting recalcitrant legislators in jail. 12 These
tensions even spilled over into judicial elections and helped make the
2000 race between Justice Alice Robie Resnick and Terrence O'Donnell
for a seat on the Ohio Supreme Court one of the ugliest-and most
expensive-judicial campaigns in recent history. 13 This illustrates the
significant political pressure that elected judges may face from
individuals and interest groups that have an interest in a court's
decisions. Nevertheless, the failure to unseat Resnick also illustrates how
difficult it may be for such pressures to overcome the inertia of judicial
incumbency.
Although far-reaching, many of the changes sought hy the DeRolph
plaintiffs were reasonable and, despite much rhetoric about judicial
activism, the Ohio Supreme Court was more constrained in its rulings
than courts of other states, such as Kentucky or Vermont. 14 In Kentucky,
for example, the courts engaged in a process that can fairly be described
as judiciallawmaking. 15 Although a number of other state courts adopted
8. Jonathan L. Entin, judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 Cap. U. !.. Rev. 523, 537
(2002) [hereinafter Entin, judicial Selection]; Jonathan L. Entin, Schools Need the Judicial Process,
Columbus Dispatch A13 (Mar. 12, 1999).
9. See David Owsiany, The General Assembly v. The Supreme Court: Who Makes Pu/J[ic
Policy in Ohio?, 32 U. Toledo I.. Rev. 549, 557-59 (20()[) (stating that the General Assembly should
"reassert itself' rather than acquiesce "to mandates from an overreaching court").
10. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1211 (Ohio 200l) (Douglas, J., concurring) [hereinafter
DeRolph /Il]; Owsiany, supra n. 9, at 555-57.
11. See DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1211 (Douglas, )., c'oncurring); Anne M. Haynes, Student
Author, Tension in the Judicial-Legislative Relationship: DeRolph v. State, 32 U. Toledo L. Rev. 611,
649 (2001).
12. See DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1211 (Douglas,)., concurring).
13. See infra nn. 336- 48 and accompanying Lexl.
14. See Rose v. Council fin Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (holding Kentucky's entire
education system-not just its school funding scheme-unconstitutional under an adequacy-based
analysis); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (holding Vermont's school finance system
unconstitutional without even establishing facts at trial concerning the inequities or inadequacies of
the system).
15. In Rose v. Council .f(n a Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court relied on a
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Kentucky's definition of adequacy, 16 the Ohio Supreme Court avoided
such an approach. In doing so, the Court left itself open to criticism not
only from political conservatives, who attacked the Court for "legislating
from the bench," but also from liberals who criticized the Court for
failing to hold education a fundamental right and for giving too little
guidance to the legislature. Indeed, the relatively little treatment that
DeRolph has thus far received in the academic literature may stem from
the fact that, despite much political rhetoric to the contrary, the core
decision showed neither extreme activism nor restraint, but rather a
medium between the two. 17
I.

OHIO'S PRE-DEROLPH SCHOOL FINANCE HISTORY

Education was an important part of the public trust in Ohio even
before the State had a written constitution. The Land Ordinance of May
20, 1785, which provided for the surveying of lands in the Western
Territory (of which Ohio was a part), reserved one thirty-sixth of every
township in the Territory for the maintenance of public schools. 18
Congress intended this grant to support the public schools of the state in
perpetuity. 19 The Northwest Territory Ordinance built upon this
foundation, expressly dictating that "schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged." 20

constitutional provision requiring that the state "provide for an efficient system of common schools"
to set its own substantive guidelines for the state's education system. 790 S.W.2d at 189. The factors
for determining adequacy were mostly aspirational, and included such requirements ensuring that all
students have "sufficient self-knowledge" and an ability to react to "complex and rapidly changing
situation[sj." Id. at 212. However laudable these goals, they have little support as a constitutional
requirement.
16. See e.g. McDuffy v. Sec. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (adopting verbatim
Kentucky's adequacy standard).
17. See infra nn. 442-45 and accompanying text; see generally Larry ). Obhof, Rethinking
judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litigation, 27 Harv. ).L. & Pub. Policy 569,
598-607 (2004) (arguing that DeRolph I balances the principles of judicial activism and judicial
restraint). Obhof compares the moderate approach followed by the Ohio Supreme Court in DeRolph
I with courts that have been more activist and more restrained. For examples of each extreme,
compare Brigham, 692 A.2d 384 (relying on a very weak educational provision to support an equity
requirement) with Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996) (holding
issues of school finance to be left solely to the legislative branch and therefore nonjusticiable).
18. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 768 (Douglas, )., concurring) (citing Northwest Territory
Ordinance, art. Ill,§ 14, 1 Stat. 51).
19. Id. (Douglas,)., concurring) (citing Spayde et al., Baldwin's Ohio School Law 2, § 1.03
(West 1984)).
20. Id. at 769 (Douglas, )., concurring) (citing \lorthwest Territory Ordinance art. Ill, § 14
(17H7); I Stat. 51); see also janis ). Wintcrhof, Student Author, From Rationing Toilet Paper to
Computer Hook-ups with Moscow: Wealth-based Disparities Are Held Unconstitutional in De Rolph v.
Ohio, 31 Creighton L. Rev. 1251, 1270 (1998).
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The framers of the Ohio Constitution believed that education was the
building block of liberty and opportunity. 21 Education was considered so
important that it was made a part of Ohio's first Bill of Rights. 22 This
stated, in part, "[R]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being essential to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not
inconsistent with the rights of conscience." 23 The 1802 Ohio
Constitution also contained an explicit guarantee that no law could be
passed to prevent the poor from equal participation in the schools,
academies, colleges and universities within the State. 24
These education provisions were significantly strengthened as a
result of the State's second Constitutional Convention in 1850-1851.
Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 made public schools
the responsibility of the State: "it shall be the duty of the General
Assembly to pass suitable laws[,] ... to encourage schools and the means
of instruction." 25 The State's new Education Clause, found in Section 2,
Article VI and unaltered since its adoption, also imposed a stringent
standard by requiring the State legislature to "secure a thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the state." 26 By imposing
this standard, Ohio became the first state to require a "thorough and
efficient" educationY Although no explicit definition of "thorough and
efficient" was given in the final committee report adopted by the 1851
Convention, the debates surrounding the topic support the view that the
goal of public schools was "excellence ... rather than mediocrity; and
that education of the public was intended to be a fundamental function
of the state .... "28
21. Winterhof, supra n. 20, at 1254 (citing DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 736).
22. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 736; see Ohio Const. art. Vlll, § 3 (1802).
23. Ohio Const. art. VIII,§ 3 ( 1802).
24.

See Ohio Const. art. VIII,§ 25 (1802).

25. Ohio Const. art. I,§ 7 (1851).
26. Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2.
27. Cindy M. O'Neil, Student Author, Ohio's School Funding Dilemma: A Review ofDeRolph
v. State, 27 Cap. U. 1.. Rev. 891,901 (1999) (citing Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.F..2d 859,866 (W.Va. 1979)).
28. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 772 (Douglas, j., concurring). justice Andrew Douglas'
concurrence to DeRolph I contains several examples, drawn from the Convention's debates, which
support this view. See id. at 770-72 (Douglas, j., concurring). justice Douglas found in these debates
evidence that education is a fundamental right of all Ohioans, a view not shared by the majorities in
any of the DeRolph decisions. Jd. at 772 (Douglas, j., concurring).
The author of this Article finds Douglas' arguments rhetorically persuasive, but notes the
difficulties associated with using the Convention debates to prove something not found within the
text of the constitutional provisions themselves. Even if one considers the search for intent a proper
criterion for judicial decision-making, legislative debates generally cannot provide reliable indicia of
intent. For most issues, there is no collective understanding-at least not one that can be discernedand public statements point in different directions. It is thus often possible to find something in a
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The Ohio legislature reaffirmed the State's commitment to
educational equity early in the twentieth century by requiring the State to
provide minimum support to poor school districts. 29 Even in the 1990s,
however, many Ohio schools faced such serious resource deficiencies that
commentators compared them to the eighteenth-century England of
Oliver Twist. 30 How could this have happened? We must begin by
examining twentieth-century school finance and the Ohio cases that
helped shape it.

A.

Miller v. Korns: the Meaning of "Thorough and Efficient"

DeRolph was not the first case in which the Ohio Supreme Court
sought to define the meaning of the State's Education Clause, or even the
first time that it was asked to consider the constitutionality of the State's
school finance system. The Court first attempted to explain the
"thorough and efficient" standard in Miller v. Korns. 31
The Ohio Supreme Court decided Miller v. Korns and its sister case,
Board of Education of Silver Lake v. Korns, in 1923. The plaintiffs in these
cases sought to enjoin the State's practice of apportioning tax revenues to
school districts. 32 They argued that apportioning money raised in one
school district to be spent in another district was unconstitutional. The
Court, however, held that under Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
Constitution, maintaining a "thorough and efficient" system of public

provision's history to support almost any argument. See Antonio Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
29-37 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (demonstrating the problems associated with using legislative
history as indicia of intent). This seems true enough for Justice Douglas' assertion that education is a
fundamental right in Ohio. Douglas' concurrence touches on only a handful of Framers' intentions,
and probably not enough to definitively establish an unwritten intent for education to be a
fundamental right.
29. See Ohio Sen. 103, 77th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1906), 98 Ohio Laws 200 !(After a
showing of insufficient funds, "the school district is hereby authorized to receive from the state
treasury sufficient money to make up this deficiency.").
30. See Ronald M. McMillan, Please Senator, I Want Some More: The General Assembly Gets
an "F" from the DeRolph Court, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 773, 773 (1997). McMillan describes the
conditions of Ohio's poorest schools in dramatic fashion:
The building is poorly heated; but the cold has its advantages, for it keeps away the cockroaches
that infest the school during the warmer months. Also, since the building is too cold to melt the
snow on the roof, it keeps the roof from leaking the way it does after a spring rain. A child is
coughing, but she does not know if her cough is from a cold, or from the kerosene fumes or
coal dust that pervade the air of the school. If you had to guess ... you might be inclined to
guess eighteenth-century England .. This 'picture' however, was actually taken from the
schools in the State of Ohio in 1993.

Id.
31. Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773 (Ohio 1923).
32. Id. at 776-77.
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education was an expressly statewide-not local-purpose. 33 Judge Allen
explained that the "thorough and efficient" clause "calls for the
upbuilding of a system of schools throughout the state, and the
attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that system is thus
expressly made a purpose, not local, not municipal, but statewide." 34
Having determined that Ohio's goal of appropriating funding
statewide was not merely a legitimate government purpose but indeed
was constitutionally mandated, 35 the Miller Court defined "thorough and
efficient" in negative terms. A thorough system was not one, the Court
stated, in which any number of school districts were "starved for
funds." 36 An efficient system, it further stated, could not be one in which
part or any number of school districts "lacked teachers, buildings, or
equipment." 37 Although other litigants and courts were decades away
from defining school finance litigation in such terms, the Ohio Supreme
Court's holding in Miller v. Korns appeared to support a statewide
adequacy standard for school finance. Notwithstanding Miller, however,
the Ohio Supreme Court heard an equity-based challenge to the State's
school finance system in the late 1970s and found the system
constitutionally permissible. 38
B. Board of Education v. Walter and the Search for Equity

Like many states, the central element of Ohio's school finance system
has long been the "Foundation Program." 39 Under a foundation

33. Id. al 776.
34. Id.
35. Sec Id. ("[Tjhe sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General Assembly to secure
not merely a system of common schools, but a system thorough and efficient throughout the state.").
/d.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823 (Ohio 1979) (finding "local control"
sufficitnt grounds for interdistrict inequalities under the rational basis analysis; upholding Ohio's
school finance system against equal protection claims).
39. State aid to school districts has historically taken three basic forms: flat grants, foundation
programs, and percentage equalizing. Although a number of states previously relied on flat grantsan equal distribution of funds to each district, regardless of need-such programs have fallen out of
favor. Today no state relies solely on such a system. Mark G. Yudof et al., Education Policy and the
Law 593 (3d ed., West 1992). Under the foundation approach, the state guarantees each district some
minimum level ,,f funding, provided the district meet its burden of imposing an agreed upon
minimum tax rate. Id. Percentage equalizing occurs when a school district itself determines the size
of its budget, and the state provides a percentage of that number. Id. at 593-94. Each of these
formulas has an equalizing effect across districts, hut this effect is relatively weak. Other provisions,
including "save harmless" provisions that guarantee districts the same amount of aid they received
the prior year, further dilute this equalizing effect and "in practice have the effect of maintaining the
disparities among districts." Id. at 594.
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approach, the state guarantees each district a certain minimum level of
funding, provided the district meets its own minimally required effort by
imposing an agreed upon minimum tax rate. 40 Ohio's first foundation
program, adopted in 1935, provided substantial aid to all school
districts. 41 By the mid-1960s the State was providing roughly one-third of
the operating costs of local districts. 42 Legislation was enacted in the late
1960s and early 1970s that increased state support even furtherY At the
same time, however, an increasing number of states faced court
challenges to their school finance systems, and Ohio was no exception.
There are significant theoretical and empirical disputes about the
importance of finance in the delivery of a quality education. 44 Those
debates notwithstanding, educational opportunity is typically defined in
terms of resource inputs, such as funding levels, as well as the number
and quality of teachers, texts, and other quantifiable factors. 45 Variations
on these measures, including per pupil expenditures, are significant both
within and among states. 46 In any system where local property taxes
account for a significant portion of the school finance system, a basic,
inescapable problem remains: "property values are unequally distributed
across school districts and across states." 47 Inequalities in revenues per
40. !d. at 593.
41. Haynes, supra n. II, at 622 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (Ohio
1979)).
42.

ld. (citing Bd. ofEduc. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821(0hio 1979)).

43. !d.
44. These disputes made their way into the various DeRolph decisions. For example, Chief
justice Thomas Moyer's dissents in DeRolph I and II each highlight the idea that spending is not the
most important predictor of student performance. Moyer argues that "factors related to families and
economic opportunity," and not school finance, are the most influential. See DeRolph v. State, 728
N.E.2d 993, 1034-35 (2000) (Moyer, C.)., dissenting) [hereinafter DeRolph II].
45. Yudof, et al., supra n. 39, at 591 (citing james Coleman, The Concept of Educational
Opportunity, 38 Harv. Educ. Rev. 7 (1968)).
46. See id. Yudof points out that there are at least three kinds of disparities in school finance:
interstate, intrastate/interdistrict, and intradistrict. Among these, both interstate and interdistrict
disparities appear prominent. "[I]nterstate disparities in per pupil expenditures are significant ...
[and] the disparity between the poorest district in one state and one of the highest spending districts
in another state are orders of higher magnitude." !d. (emphasis in original). Interdistrict disparities
within a state, often the subject of school finance litigation, are also significant. In many states the
level of spending in one district may be four times that of another district within the same state. I d. at
592.
47. Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the Present, in
Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance 7, 8 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., Nat!. Acad. Press 1999).
Signiftcant differences in property valuation carry obvious implications for school finance. "Local
property tax-based finance schemes result in some school districts collecting substantially more tax
dollars than others depending on the taxable wealth available in the district, regardless of the tax rate
imposed." Swenson, supra n. 4, at 1147-48 (citing R. Craig Wood & David C. Thompson,
Educational Finance Law: Constitutional Challenges to State Aid Plans-An Analysis of Strategies 54
(2d ed., Education Law Association 1996)).
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pupil therefore exist within and among school districts. These
inequalities "are primarily the result of differences among districts in per
pupil taxable property base." 48
By the 1970s, many people were concerned about the real and
perceived inequalities in some states' funding schemes and sought greater
educational "equity." In positive terms, the search for equity meant that
all students should be given an equal opportunity to succeed. 49 In
negative terms, it meant that a student's success should not depend on
circumstances outside of his or her control, such as the geographic
location or wealth of the family. 5° School districts and individuals soon
began asking the courts to distribute resources more equally among
schools and school districts.
Approximately thirty states were involved in some sort of school
finance litigation during the 1970s. 51 More than twenty of these states
modified their education finance systems, some due to political
pressures, and some as a result of judicial decisions and orders. 52 A
number of these equity lawsuits, however, were rejected. These included
cases in Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. 53 It was in 1979, in
Board of Education v. Walter, that the Ohio Supreme Court first
responded to-and rejected-an equity challenge to the State's school
funding scheme. 54
In 1976, the Board of Education and Superintendent of Schools of
Cincinnati, along with parents, students, and other individuals, brought
an action for declaratory judgment against the State of Ohio. The
plaintiffs' claim in Walter rested on both the State's Equal Protection
Clause 55 and the "thorough and efficient" standard of the Education
Clause. 56 The trial court found that the State's financing scheme violated
both provisions. 57 The appeals court reversed on the "thorough and
efficient" grounds but upheld the decision on equal protection grounds.
In doing so, the court found that education was a fundamental right, and

48. Yudof et al., supra n. 39, at 593.
49. Berne & Stiefel, supra n. 47, at 13.
50. !d.
51. Yudof et al., supra n. 39, at 592.
52. Id.
53. See Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Bd. ofEduc. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
54. See Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (rejecting state equal protection and education provision
challenges based on the grounds that the legislature has discretion in educational matters, and the
court will not interfere with such discretion where education appears adequate).
55. See Ohio Con st. art. I, § 2.
56.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 815.

57. Id.

92

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2005

that there was no compelling state interest to justify the disparities in
funding. 58
When the Ohio Supreme Court heard Walter, it redefined the issue
as one of taxation, concerned more with "the way in which Ohio has
decided to collect and spend state and local taxes than ... the way in
which Ohio educates its children." 59 The Court affirmed the court of
appeals in part and reversed in part, finding no violations of either the
Equal Protection Clause or the Education Clause. 60
Perhaps more important to the future DeRolph litigants than the
decision itself was the Ohio Supreme Court's unambiguous statement
that it had jurisdiction in such cases. The Walter Court acknowledged
that it is the province of the legislature to determine a funding scheme,
but stated that where legislative enactments violate the fundamental law
(such as the requirements of the Ohio Constitution), the courts have not
only the power, but also the duty, to declare such enactments invalid.
"One of the basic functions of the courts under our system of separation
of powers is to compel the other branches of government to conform to
the basic law." 61 The Court nonetheless held that the legislature had not
violated its broad discretion in enacting the system at issue.
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis in Walter with a
discussion of Ohio's finance system. The State's Foundation Program
had been changed to a two-tiered "Equal Yield Formula" in fiscal year
1975-1976.62 The first tier guaranteed a specific amount of funding per
student per mill assessed by the school district up to 20 mills. 63 If local
taxes were insufficient to meet the present amount, the State would make
up the difference. A second tier enabled districts to obtain additional
state support by increasing local taxes greater than 20 mills (but not more
than 30 mills). 64 The Equal Yield Formula at issue in Walter was

58. !d. at 817.
59. Id.at819.
60. Justice Ralph S. Lochner dissented, and argued that education was a fundamental right
"implicitly mandated" by the Ohio Constitution. !d. at 826-27 (Lochner, ]., dissenting). justice
Lochner stated that the system therefore failed under an equal protection analysis because he found
no compelling interest for the system's inequalities. He further argued that the system was not
"thorough and efficient" because school districts were "starved f(>r funds" and children were
"deprived of educational opportunity." Id. at 829 (Lochner,)., dissenting).
61. Id. at 823.
62. See Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 170, 11lth Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. ( 1975), 136 Ohio
Laws 475; see also Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 821 (discussing the history of school finance 111 Ohio).
63. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816. A "mill" is equal to one-thousandth of a dollar (.001), and is the
measurement used to determine the amount of money raised through property taxes. The amount of
money that a school district will raise through one mill is therefore equal to the total taxable property
value in a given district, multiplied by .001.
64. Id. at 816-17.
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therefore designed to enable districts to obtain even more funding per
pupil than necessary to meet the state-determined cost of education,
regardless of the amount that could be raised from local property taxes. 65
The Walter Court rejected the equal protection claims against Ohio's
local property tax-based system. 66 The Court did not find a fundamental
right to education, but it also did not explicitly reject the notion of
education as a fundamental right. Writing for the Court, Justice Brown
said, "We have not found helpful the concept of a 'fundamental' right.
No one has successfully defined the term for this purpose .... [But]
because this cause deals with difficult questions of local and statewide
taxation, fiscal planning and education policy, we feel that this is an
inappropriate cause in which to invoke 'strict scrutiny."' 67 The Court
therefore applied the more lenient rational basis test, and found that local
control not only provided a rational basis for the spending disparities,
but was "of overriding importance from an educational standpoint." 68
Thus, although the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that reliance on
property taxes may lead to inequality, it held that some inequality alone
is not a sufficient basis for striking down the State's funding scheme.
The Walter Court's decision relied heavily on the existence of an
"Education Review Committee," established by the General Assembly to
recommend the minimum amount of funding necessary to provide each
student with a high-quality education. 69 The review board at issue in
Walter recommended funding of $715 per student, which the first tier of
the Equal Yield Formula easily surpassed by establishing a funding level
of $960 per student? 0 Schools were also eligible to receive up to an
additional $420 per student through the second tier of the formula? 1 The
Court thus held that the legislature had fulfilled its duties under the
Education Clause because the Equal Yield Formula enabled districts to
meet the minimum standards set by the Education Review Committee. 72
65. Suzanne Ernst Drummond, Student Author, Deja Vu: The Status of School Funding in
Ohio after DeRolph II, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 435,441 (2000).
66. Kristen Safier, Student Author, The Question of a Fundamental Right to a Minimally
Adequate Education, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 993, 1011 (2001) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d
813,826 (Ohio 1979)).
67. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 819.
68. Id. at 822 (citing Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972)
(Burger, C.j., dissenting)).
69. Drummond, supra n. 65, at 441; see Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 817.
70. james Hogan, Student Author, School Funding . .. Not so Elementary: Determining the
Constitutionality of Ohio School Funding Legislation after De Rolph v. State, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 323,
330-31 (1998).
71. Id. at 331.
72. Drummond, supra n. 65, at 441 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio
1979)).
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Having determined that "each child received an adequate education," the
Court concluded by noting that the possibility of creating an even more
thorough and efficient system was immaterial to the constitutionality of
the current one. 73
Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Walter, the
legislature eliminated both the Equal Yield Formula and the Education
Review Committee that had been so important to the Court's decision? 4
It replaced this program with a new Foundation Program-a complex
system designed to ensure that each district would receive enough local
property tax revenue and state funding to attain a state-defined per pupil
foundation amount. This foundation amount was estimated by the State
Board of Education to be roughly $4,000 in 1992; for the fiscal year 19921993, however, the amount actually provided was only $2,817? 5 This
system, the post- Walter Foundation Program, would be at the center of
the DeRolph controversy in the 1990s.
II.

THE SHIFT FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY: THE ORIGINS OF DEROLPH
V. STATE

Of the eight school finance cases tried by various state supreme
courts between 1981 and 1988, the plaintiffs were successful in only
one?6 The recession of 1981-1982, combined with a growing sentiment
that the problems of school finance had been "dealt with" in the prior
decade, weakened both legal and popular support for equity measures? 7
When A Nation at Risk was published in 1983, however, it called
attention to the inadequacies, both real and perceived, of education in the
United States. 78 Governors and state legislators turned their attention
toward "achieving excellence in education," often by changing education
standards, graduation requirements, and teacher certification
requirements and compensation? 9
While most of these "second wave" cases still focused on equality,

73. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825-26.
74. Drummond, supra n. 65, at 441; see also DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745 (noting that the
equal yield formula challenged in Walter was repealed shortly after the case was decided); Hogan,
supra n. 70, at 338 (same).
75. Haynes, supra n. 11, at 624-25 (citing DeRolph v. State, No. 94-CA-477, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3915, at 5 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Aug. 30, 1995)).
76. Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in Equity
and Adequacy in Education Finance 136, 146 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., Nat!. Acad. Press 1999).
77. Id. at 146-47.
78. See Nat!. Commn. on Excellence in Educ., U.S. Dept. of Educ., A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983).
79. Carr & Fuhrman, supra n. 76, at 147.
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some also dealt with state constitutional provisions requiring an adequate
or thorough system of public schools. 80 This trend became increasingly
common as plaintiffs recognized a number of problems with the equity
approach. Among the most important was the simple fact that fiscal
equality offers no solutions if all districts are equally funded at an
inadequate level. 81 Indeed, thanks in part to the experience in California
following Serrano v. Priest and its progeny, Proposition 13, many saw the
banner of "equity" as "equally bad for all." 82 By the late 1980s, any theory
that hoped to succeed had to shed the idea of leveling-down funding
from the highest spending districts.

A.

Searching for a Remedy: the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian
Schools

Ohio's school district superintendents sought to increase funding to
primary and secondary education throughout the 1980s. Many believed
the Walter decision was too political. Some thought that the system was
broken in 1979, and that it had remained that way after the Court's
decision. 83 Thus in the mid-1980s a group of Appalachian-area school
superintendents began working toward obtaining equal educational
opportunities for the children in rural southeastern Ohio. These school
districts suffered from low funding levels, inadequate facilities, poor
curriculum, and a lack of special education programs. 84 In 1987,
southeastern Ohio school superintendents initiated an effort called
Promoting Appalachian and Rural Initiatives for Teaching Youth
(PARITY). 85 This initiative was designed to communicate the lack of
80. Kelly Thompson Cochran, Student Author, Beyond School Financing, Defining the
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399,411 (2000).
81. Yudof et al., supra n. 39, at 810.
82. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) [hereinafter Serrano II]. Following Serrano
II the voters of California passed Proposition 13, a constitutional amendment that limited property

tax rates to 1o/o of the cash value of real property subject to taxation. See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen
D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and
Future, in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance 34, 49 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., N atl. Acad.
Press 1999). Proposition 13 also required a two-thirds vote of the legislature to increase state taxes
and absolutely prohibited the imposition of a statewide property tax. Id. Over time the effect of
Proposition 13 has been to slow the overall growth in spending. California has therefore gone from
being one of the highest spending states for elementary and secondary education to one of the
lowest. Id. The Serrano cases and Proposition 13 became increasingly unpopular, and in fact may
have dramatically reduced public support for education. William N. Evans et al., The Impact of
Court-Mandated School Finance Reform, in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance 72, 75 (Helen
F. Ladd et al. eds., Natl. Acad. Press 1999).
83. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
84. Jd.
85. See Early History and Formation of the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools,
available at http:/ /www.coras.org/early%20history.htm (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
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educational opportunity and the school-funding inequities in poor, rural
Appalachian school districts to members of the Ohio General Assembly.
Fearing that PARITY would not achieve its political goals, the
superintendents reorganized as the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian
Schools (CORAS) in July 1988, ostensibly for the purposes of researching
and discussing the problems facing schools in rural southeastern Ohio. 86
In the late 1980s CORAS funded research aimed at improving Ohio's
education system. A study done for CORAS by Dr. Kern Alexander, a
nationally recognized school finance expert from Virginia Tech
University, concluded that Ohio's school finance system was both
inequitable and inadequate. 87 Dr. Alexander found that Ohio was far
behind other industrial states in its level of state funding for public
education. 88
CORAS was already quite large by the time Dr. Alexander's study
was released-it had (and maintains to this day) roughly 125 member
school districts in the twenty-nine county region of Ohio designated as
Appalachia. 89 In 1990, CORAS began to discuss its findings with district
superintendents statewide, who were generally frustrated with their
inability to change the school finance system through normal political
channels (such as contacting their legislators). 90 They decided to once
again test the efficacy of litigation, and organized into a broader coalition
aimed solely at challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's school finance
systemY 1 Thus the Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School
Funding (the "Coalition") was formed in 1990 with approximately 275
member school districts statewide. 92 The Coalition's only mandate was to
"secure adequate educational opportunities for all school children." 93
This mission would mix well with the direction of school finance suits in

86.

Id.

87. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6; see also Ohio Coalition for Equity &
Adequacy of School Funding, The Who, What, When, Where and Why of De Rolph 4 (2002) (stating
that Dr. Alexander's study "documented enormous inequities among schools in Ohio"), available at
http://v.ww.ohiocoalition.org/PDFs/fornewsupts.pdf.
88. Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding, supra n. 87, at 4.
89. See Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools, available at http://www .coras.org/.
90. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
91. Id.
92. Id.; Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding, Ohio Coalition for Equity &
Adequacy
of
School
Funding:
Mission
and
Progress
5,
available
at
http://v.ww.ohiocoalition.org/PDFs/Tabloid2.pdf. The Coalition is organized as a council of
governments under Chapter 167 of the Ohio Revised Code, which allows political subdivisions to
organize for the purpose of engaging in cooperative efforts. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 167.01-.08
(West 2002).
93. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6; Ohio Coalition for Equity &
Adequacy of School Funding, supra n. 92, at 4.
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other states.
By the late 1980s, plaintiffs nationwide were finding potential in the
adequacy approach. This standard received some support from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, which rejected a federal equity claim but
recognized the difference between an "unequal system" and one that
"occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
children." 94 The Rodriguez Court acknowledged that a system that
absolutely precluded poor children from receiving an education "would
present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial
assistance" than mere equity suitsY 5
A third wave of school finance litigation began in 1989 with
important plaintiff victories in Kentucky and Montana. These cases have
focused on state education clauses 96 and emphasized adequacy rather
than equity. Rather than focusing on the distribution of expenditures, the
plaintiffs in the third wave cases have argued that all children are entitled
to a base level of educational quality, and have therefore sought the
financing necessary to bring the poorest school districts up to the
minimum level mandated by the state constitutions. 97 Courts soon
followed the Kentucky Supreme Court, and between 1990 and 1999 more
than a dozen states recognized a cause of action for failure to provide an
adequate education. 98 One of these states was Ohio, where the Coalition
grew to more than 580 member school districts and picked up where the
Walter plaintiffs left off by bringing a suit that sounded in both equity
and adequacy.

94. San Antonio Indcp. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
95.

Id. at 25 n. 60.

96. Every state constitution has some provision guaranteeing a right to public education.
O'Neil, supra n. 27, at 892 n. 3 (noting that "all fifty states mention education in their constitutions");
see also Swenson, supra n. 4, at 1148 n. 9 (listing state constitutional provisions); William E. Thro, A
New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & Pol. 525, 53839 n. 33 (1998).
97. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the ''Third Wave": From
Fquity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151, 1153 (1995); Ryan, supra n. 3, at 268 (citing William E.
Thro, judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts
Oeciston as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 603 ( 1994)).
98. Cochran, supra n. 80, at 415-16. Although the results of these cases have also been mixed,
a number of courts have been persuaded by evidence that their states' poorest school districts fail to
meet even minimum standards. Swenson, supra n. 4, at 1149. The third wave has been better t()r
plaintiffs, who have won 11 of 22 cases. Ryan, supra n. 3, at 269. These successes notwithstanding,
however, twenty-six courts of last resort have upheld their states' funding schemes. Swenson, supra
n. 4, at 1149.
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The Coalition and the Beginnings of the DeRolph Litigation

The Coalition, which was organized for the explicit purpose of
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's school funding system, is
unique in a number of ways. First and perhaps most important, the
Coalition has the highest percentage of school district membership of any
school finance litigation support group in the country. 99 Its membership
grew to over 500 school districts by 1992, and has ranged from 500 to 580
member districts ever since. School districts become members of the
Coalition by passing a resolution of joinder and paying an annual fee of
$0.50 per district student. Since the Coalition's inception more than 80%
of Ohio's 700-plus school districts have joined. 100
Second, the Coalition enjoys both broad support and diversity of
membership. Coalition leaders note that "[m]embers display a wide
range of pupil enrollment, fiscal capacity, report card scores, per pupil
expenditures, income and other demographics." 101 The membership
includes both low- and high-wealth districts, organized to serve the joint
goal of securing greater educational opportunities for all students. 102
CORAS also continues to work with the Coalition and has generally
supported its efforts.
The Coalition, represented by the Columbus law firm of Bricker &
Eckler, filed the DeRolph case on December 19, 1991 in the Perry County
Court of Common Pleas. The named plaintiffs consisted of five Ohio
school districts and various individuals who sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, including a determination that Ohio's public school
financing system was unconstitutional. 103 The complaint sounded in
both equity and adequacy, and focused not only on the vast inequities
among school districts but also on the unsafe facilities and inadequate
curriculum of the lowest -spending districts. 104 The five school districts
that brought the suit were located hundreds of miles apart, and included
districts in urban Youngstown (located in the northeastern part of the
State), rural Lima (located on the State's western border with Indiana),
and rural Appalachian districts in the southeast.

99. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6; Ohio Coalition for Equity &
Adequacy of School Funding, supra n. 98, at 5.
100. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6; Ohio Coalition for Equity &
Adequacy of School Funding, supra n. 92, at 5.
101. Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding, supra n. 92, at 5. Indeed, the
leaders of the Coalition believe that it is the most diverse school finance litigation support group in
the nation. I d.
102. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
103. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 734.
104. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
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The plaintiff districts provided stark examples of the conditions
among the State's poorest schools. Such conditions, however, were
representative of those of a much larger group of districts. 105 Although
the Ohio Supreme Court had previously rejected an equity challenge to
the State's finance system, the Coalition hoped to use the vast inequities
between districts to highlight the inadequacy of funding to the poorer
districts. 106
Although one could expect high-wealth districts to oppose the
Coalition's attempts to alter the State's funding scheme, the Coalition has
in fact faced little dissent from Ohio school districts. There has never
been an organized long-term effort by wealthy school districts to
challenge the Coalition's efforts. 107 To the contrary, even most wealthy
school districts supported the DeRolph litigation. The Alliance for
Adequate School Funding (AASF), for example, was formed in the mid1990s to protect the interests of wealthier school districts. The sixty highwealth school districts that make up the AASF have consistently
supported the Coalition's efforts on behalf of poorer school districts. The
group has even filed briefs as amicus curiae in support of the DeRolph
plaintiffs in several of the cases. 108 This is largely because the Coalition
learned from the experiences of other states, and sought only a levelingup approach that would leave wealthy school districts unharmed. This
approach has created strong support and unity within Ohio's education
community.

111.

DEROLPH !: THE QUEST FOR EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY IN OHIO

The trial in the Ferry County Court of Common Pleas was long and
complex. Over the course of 30 days, 61 witnesses testified or offered
sworn depositions, and 450 exhibits were admitted into evidence. The
trial generated more than 5,600 pages of transcripts. 109 Although the
parties disagreed over the constitutionality of the funding system, there
were no significant disputes over the facts of the case. Both sides agreed

105. When asked if the specific districts involved in the lawsuit were perhaps not representative
of Ohio schools as a whole, Coalition Executive Director William Phillis stated that the Coalition
could have just as easily highlighted "the poor conditions in Cleveland, Akron, or Cincinnati" and
any of "roughly seventy-five different rural districts" to demonstrate the inadequacies of Ohio's
school funding system. Id.
106. Id. ("It was both an adequacy and an equity case all along .... We hoped to use the
inequities to show the inadequacies.").
107. Id.
108. The AASF filed a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of the state defendants in DeRolph I, but
sided with the De Rolph plaintiffs in the subsequent cases. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 734.
109. Id.
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that the conditions of many schools were squalid. According to the trial
court, "plaintiff and defense witnesses alike testified as to the
inadequacies of Ohio's system of school funding and the need for
reform." 110 The defendant State Board of Education not only advocated
comprehensive reform but also set equity, adequacy, and reliability of
school funding as the goals of such reform. 111
On July l, 1994, the trial court issued a 478-page opinion containing
extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge Linton Lewis held
that Ohio's school finance system violated both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Education Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 112 Judge
Lewis relied heavily on evidence of "gross disparities in funding among
the districts, the failure of curriculum to prepare students for higher
education, and the appalling condition of Ohio's school facilities" to hold
that the State had not met the requirements of a "thorough and efficient"
education under Section 2, Article VI. 113 The court ordered the
Superintendent of Public Schools and the State Board of Education to
submit proposals to the State legislature that would eliminate wealthbased disparities among districts. 114 Although the State Board of
Education voted not to appeal the trial court's decision, the Ohio
Attorney General appealed the decision to the Fifth District Court of
Appeals. 115 This was done at the urging of then-Governor George
Voinovich, who had already undertaken a series of education reforms
and hoped that DeRolph would ultimately be overturned by the Ohio
Supreme Court. 116
The Fifth District Court of Appeals relied on Board of Education v.
Walter to reverse the trial court's decision. A majority of the court held
110. Id.
111. Id. The State Board has continued to advocate such reforms. "The Board of Education
wants funding that is stable, reliable, and equitable." Telephone Interview with Matt DeTemple,
Chief Counsel for the Ohio Department of Education (May 14, 2003).
112. As part of its equal protection analysis the trial court also determined that education was a
fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution. See DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 297 (Ohio
C.P. Perry, july 1, 1994).
113. Drummond, supra n. 65, at 442.
114. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 734-735.
115. Id. at 735.
116. According to William Phillis, Executive Director of the Coalition, c;overnor Voinovich
"blasted the trial judge" t(Jr his "overreaching," and expected the Ohio Supreme Court to overturn
the trial court's decision. For the plaintiffs, the Governor's decision to appeal the case signified a
refusal to abide by the court's ruling and a declination to fix the state's education problems.
Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6. Some legislators, however, saw things very
differently. "Governor Voinovich had a whole program of school reforms, including statewide
testing, academic accountability measures, and efforts toward equalization." Telephone Interview
with William Batchelder, Fonner Speaker Pro Tempore of the Ohio House of Representatives (May
5, 2003)
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that Judge Lewis had exceeded his authority by requiring new legislation
from the General Assembly, and that this was an impermissible attempt
by the courts to legislate school funding. 117 In reversing the equal
protection holding, the court reasoned that in Walter the Ohio Supreme
Court had decided that education was not a fundamental right under the
Ohio Constitution. 118 The appellate court also emphasized the separation
of powers and pointed to the broad discretion granted to the legislature.
The court argued that it was required by the Walter precedent to uphold
the system: "The law enunciated in Walter is binding ... upon this court
and only the Supreme Court and the General Assembly can change Ohio
1aw. nll9
Although the Fifth District Court of Appeals held the system
constitutionally permissible, none of the parties to the appeal disputed
that the system suffered from extreme inequalities. Judge Reader made
this very clear in his concurrence to the appellate decision: "The
defendants ... agreed with almost everything the plaintiff-appellee stated.
In fact, an examination of testimony by defense witnesses in this case
would indicate . . . that the system of funding was immoral and
inequitable. If there was ever a case where the parties acted more in
concert than this one, I haven't seen it." 120 In contrast, Judge W. Scott
Gwin dissented and argued that Ohio's school finance system simply did
not meet the Miller standard of"thorough and efficient." 121
A.

The Ohio Supreme Court - Round I

The Ohio Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a discretionary
appeal, and arguments were offered in late 1996. 122 On March 24, 1997,
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that
Ohio's school finance system was in fact not "thorough and efficient." 123
Justice Francis Sweeney's opinion for the four-to-three majority in
117. McMillan, supra n. 30, at 775 (citing DeRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316 at 11 (Ohio App.
5th Dist. Aug. 30, 1995)).
118. DeRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316, at 2-3 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Aug. 30, 1995)). This
reasoning does not properly follow from the Walter decision. As noted above, the Walter Court
declined to hold education a fundamental right. The Court did not, however, hold that education is
not a fundamental right. See supra nn. 66-68 and accompanying text.
119. DcRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316, at 2-3.
120. Id. at 11 (Reader, j., concurring); see also DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 735 (same). Nor was
judge Reader's statement mere hyperbole. "Judge Reader's statement was a pretty accurate
representation," notes Department of Education counsel Matt DeTemple. "The State Board had
voted not to appeal ... and the Department's position at that time was that the system was not
'thorough and efficient."' Telephone Interview with Matt DeTemple, supra n. 111.
121. DeRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316, at 17 (Gwin, j., dissenting).
122. De Rolph J, 677 N .E.2d at 733.
123. Id. at 747.
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DeRolph I began by dismissing claims that the courts were engaging in

impermissible judicial activism. "Under the long-standing doctrine of
judicial review, it is our sworn duty to determine whether the General
Assembly has enacted legislation that is constitutional." 124 The Court
acknowledged the legislature's discretion in such areas and noted that
such legislation is presumptively valid. The decision followed, however,
that the presumption of constitutionality is rebuttable, and that the Ohio
Supreme Court would not "dodge [its] responsibility" by declaring the
case nonjusticiable. 125 "Fortunately, however, for the people, the function
of the judiciary in deciding constitutional questions is not one which [the
Ohio Supreme Court] is at liberty to decline." 126
After asserting its jurisdiction, the Court described and criticized the
complex statutory scheme of Ohio's school funding system. 127 Funding
was available to districts from two primary sources: state revenue,
available through the School Foundation Program, and local revenue,
derived mostly from local property taxes. 128 Contrary to the national
trend, Ohio relied more on local revenue than state revenue. 129 Under
the Foundation Program, state aid was available for school districts that
levied at least 20 mills of local property tax revenue for current operating
expenses. 130 State basic aid for qualifying school districts was calculated
as a part of the legislature's biennial budget. 131
The Court found that the foundation amount was a budgetary
residual, and that the formula amount for determining aid bore no
relation to what it actually costs to educate a student. 132 The foundation
dollar amount, the Court said,
is determined as a result of working backwards through the state aid
formula after the legislature determines the total dollars to be allocated
to primary and secondary education in each biennial budget. Thus, the
foundation level reflects political and budgetary considerations at least
as much as it reflects a judgment as to how much money should be

124. Id. at 737.
125. Id.
126. ld. (citing Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (1989) (quoting
Morton v. Gordon, Oallam 396, 397-98 (Republic of Tex. 1841)).
127. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 737-40. For an excellent, brief explanation of the foundation
f(Jrmula, see Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools under State Constitutional Law, 2 ).
Gender Race & just. 279, 288-89 (1999).
128. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 738.
129. !d. For example, in the 1991-1992 school year schools received 5.7% federal funding,
42.7% state funding, and 51.6% local funding. DeRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316, at 2.
130.

De Rolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 738.

131. Id.
132. Id.
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spent on K-12 education. 133
In 1992-1993, the State financing began at a base level of $2,817 per
pupil. That figure was then adjusted by an equalization factor, called the
"cost of doing business" factor, which assumed that costs were lower in
rural schools than in urban ones. 134 The State then subtracted an amount
known as a "charge off," which reflected a percentage of the taxable value
of real and tangible property in the district. 135 The remaining amount
was the district's basic state aid money. 136
As taxable wealth increased, a district's "charge off' amount
increased and lowered the district's state aid. At the same time, however,
a number of "tax reductions factors" limited increases in property taxes
and thus prevented districts from making up the charged off amount by
increasing local revenues. 137 The Supreme Court dubbed this problem
"phantom revenue" -a school district could experience an increase in the
valuation of its real property without enjoying any additional income,
but consequently receive less under the State formula because the value
of taxable property had increased. 138 The problem of phantom revenue
therefore prevented many districts from keeping pace with inflation. 139
The Ohio Supreme Court also found that many districts engaged in
"forced borrowing." 140 When a district could not meet its budget it was
forced to borrow funds. The first type of loan available was a "spending
reserve loan," borrowed against the subsequent year's revenue. 141 If this
was insufficient, districts had to borrow funds from commercial lenders.
Such loans were repaid by diverting funds that otherwise would have
been available to the district for operating expenses under the School
Foundation Program. 142
If a commercial loan was denied, the district was required to submit a
plan for reducing the district's budget. The Court found that this
systematic borrowing had dire results. "The debt which stems from
mandated borrowing programs is in many instances staggering, and the
cyclical effect of continued borrowing has made it more difficult to
133. Id. (emphasis in original).
134. This assumption often led to insufficient funding for rural districts. For example, it was
applied even to textbooks and supplies, which cost all school districts the same amount regardless of
location. Drummond, supra n. 65, at 444.
135. West, supra n. 127, at 289.
136. Id.
137. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739.
138. ld.
139. Winterhof, supra n. 20, at 1259.
140. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739.
141. ld.
142. ld. at 740.
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maintain even minimal school operations." 143 The Court characterized
the loan programs as a clever disguise for the State's failure to adequately
fund education. Last, the Court found that the School Foundation
Program contained no express aid for capital improvements, despite
sufficient evidence that vast improvements were needed. 144
Although the Ohio Supreme Court had never clearly spelled out what
a system would need to do in order to be "thorough and efficient," the
decisions from Miller and Walter provided the Court with guidelines for
making such a determination. If it followed the Miller precedent, the
Court could not uphold a system in which school districts were "starved
for funds" or "lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment." 145 To be
consistent with its holding in Walter, however, the Court had to respect
the broad discretion granted to the legislature to determine the school
finance system so long as the State set a minimum education standard
and provided the funding necessary to meet that minimum. 146
Several important factors distinguished the DeRolph litigation from
Board of Education v. Walter. For one thing, the Education Review
Committee-heavily relied on by the Walter Court-no longer existed.
That Committee had recommended the minimum total funding
necessary to the legislature before the Walter case commenced. Without
such a committee, however, the finance system of the 1990s bore no
relation to the actual cost of educating a child. As the Court pointed out,
the State Superintendent had suspended even routine minimum standard
evaluations in 1992, and no minimum standards had been regularly
enforced since that time. 147 Thus, whereas the finance scheme in Walter
had actually provided more money than the state-determined adequate
amount, the system at issue in DeRolph I did not even have a specific
target to meet. Rather than determining the cost of educating a child, the
budget process funded all other state programs first and then simply
allocated the remainder to education.
The Ohio Supreme Court applied the Miller and Walter standards of
"thorough and efficient," and found that many districts were in fact
starved for funds and lacked teachers, buildings, and equipment. 148 The
Court relied on substantial evidence that many districts suffered from
143. !d.
144. !d. at 741.
145. SeeMillerv. Korns, 140N.E. 773,776 (1923).
146. See Bd. ofEduc. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813,825 (Ohio 1979).
147. DcRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745. justice Resnick highlighted the lack of procedures to
determine the cost of an adequate education: "Yet the General Assembly does not know the actual
per-pupil cost of education in Ohio, since it has not calculated the cost of a quality education since
1973-1974." !d. at 780 (Resnick,)., concurring).
148. Id. at 746.
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"unsafe and inadequate facilities, lack of current textbooks and adequate
supplies, limited curriculum, and lack of access to modern technological
education." 149
The record from the trial court was replete with evidence of unsafe
and inadequate conditions among schools in the plaintiff districts. Just
among the districts from rural western and southeastern Ohio, the Court
found that children were attending classes in a school building that was
sliding down a hill at a rate of one inch per month; that necessities like
paper, art supplies, and toilet paper were rationed; that hundreds of
students were hospitalized because carbon monoxide leaked out of
heaters and furnaces; and that some schools lacked appropriate
structures and were forced to use closets, windowless storage rooms, and
even an unventilated coal bin as classrooms. 150 The rural Dawson-Bryant
School District still used a coal heating system that forced students to
breathe coal dust in such large proportions that it actually covered the
students' desks after accumulating overnight. 151 There was also
testimony that some schools in the plaintiff districts were not handicap
accessible. 152
The record also documented that schools in Perry County, where
DeRolph was filed, suffered from serious health and safety concerns. The
Northern Local School District had facilities with leaking roofs and
windows, an outdated sewage system that caused sewage to flow onto a
high school's baseball field, and arsenic in their drinking water. 153 The
facilities in the Southern Local School District had reached such a
dilapidated state that custodians deliberately knocked plaster off of the
ceilings so it would not fall on students. 154 Importantly, the most serious
safety concerns were not limited to the plaintiff districts. The trial court
found, for example, that asbestos had yet to be removed from 68.6% of
Ohio's school buildings, and over 99% of all Ohio public school
structures had asbestos in them. 155
The Ohio Supreme Court also placed great emphasis on The 1990
Ohio Public School Survey, commissioned by the General Assembly to
determine the cost of bringing school facilities into compliance with state
building codes and asbestos removal requirements. The survey found

149. West, supra n. 127, at 290 (citing DeRolpl! I, 677 N.E.2d at 745).
150.
151.

DeRolpii I, 677 N.E.2d at 743.
ld.

152. ld. The court noted testimony, f(H example, that a handicapped third-grader at Deering
Elementary had never been to the school's library because it was not wheelchair accessible.
153.

ld.

154. Id.
155.

/d.
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that only half of Ohio's schools contained adequate electrical systems,
and only 17% of the heating systems and 31% of the roofs were
satisfactory. 156 More than 80% of schools' windows and three-fourths of
their plumbing fixtures were inadequate. 157 Only one in five schools was
handicap accessible. 158 Perhaps most shocking, the survey found that a
paltry 30% of Ohio's schools had adequate fire alarm systems and
exterior doors. 159 In total, the survey identified a need for approximately
$10.2 billion in facility repair and construction. 160
In addition to the safety concerns, the Court found that many of the
appellant districts could not provide the basic resources necessary to
educate their students, such as new, updated textbooks. 161 Such
deficiencies garnered national media attention. A PBS report noted that
thousands of Ohio's students read textbooks that failed to mention Neil
Armstrong or the wars in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf because some
districts had gone decades without enough funding to purchase new
textbooks. 162 For some classes, moreover, there were no textbooks at
all. 163 The Court also found compelling evidence that (1) districts lacked
funds to comply with a state law requiring a district-wide average of no
more than twenty-five students per classroom teacher; 164 (2) curricula in
appellant school districts were severely limited; 165 and (3) none of the
appellant districts were able to provide appropriate technological
training. 166
The Court was shocked by the economic disparities between school
districts, and its decision rejected the notion that these disparities were
caused by a lack of effort on the part of poorer districts. "(P]oor districts
simply cannot raise as much money even with identical tax effort. For

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 742.
Id.
Id.
I d.

160. !d.
Hi!. Id. at 744.
162. Haynes, supra n. 11, at 611 (citing Children in America's Schools with Bill Moyers (PBS
Sept. 13, 1996) (television broadcast)).
163. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 744.
164. Id. Indeed, some school districts had as many as thirty-nine students per teacher.
Educators testified that it is "virtually impossible" to educate children with such a high studentteacher ratio. Id.
165. Id. For example, Dawson-Bryant elementary students had no opportunity to take
computer courses or courses in foreign language, art, or music. The junior high students had no
science lab. The high school students had no opportunity to take advanced placement courses, which
disqualified them "from even being considered for a scholarship or admittance to some universities."
I d.
166. Id. Districts lacked computers, computer labs, training, software, and related supplies.
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example, total assessed property valuation in the Dawson-Bryant School
District in 1991 was $28,882,580, while Beachwood School District in
Cuyahoga County had $376,229,512." 167 These districts had
approximately the same number of students, and thus spent vastly
different sums per pupil.
The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that these factors could lead to
poor academic performance and hamper the labor market prospects of
the appellant districts' students. 168 Indeed, districts with high local
funding tended to have substantially higher test scores. 169 In 1993, for
example, up to one-third of high school seniors in some poor districts
had not passed the ninth-grade proficiency exam, despite having six
opportunities to do so. 170 This contrasts sharply with the passage rate of
the wealthiest school districts. By way of comparison, the Beachwood
School District had one senior (out of a class of 100) who had not been
able to pass the proficiency exam in 1993. 171
For the reasons outlined above, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the State's funding system violated the "thorough and efficient"
requirements of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. "A
thorough and efficient system of common schools includes facilities in
good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain
these facilities in a safe manner .... " 172 The Court held four specific
features of the system unconstitutional. First, it held the School
Foundation Program unconstitutional because the amount of state aid
bore no relationship to the actual cost of educating a child. 173 Second, the
Court stated that Ohio's over-reliance on property taxes impermissibly
prevented poor districts from raising funds comparable to that of wealthy
districts with similar tax burdens. 174 Third, the Court unequivocally held
the requirement of school district borrowing through the spending
reserve
and
emergency
school
assistance
loan
programs
175
unconstitutional.
Last, the Court ruled that the State's facilities

167. !d. at 746.
168. See Id. at 744 ("[I]t does not appear likely that the children in appellant school districts
will be able to compete in the job market against those students with sufficient technological
training.").
169. Haynes, supra n. 11, at 627.
170. West, supra n. 127, at 290. The failure rates in plaintiff districts Dawson-Bryant and Lima
City school districts were 32% and 27%, respectively. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 744-45; id. at 762
(Douglas, j., concurring).
171. DeRulph I, 677 N.E.2d at 762 (Douglas, j., concurring).
172. !d. at 747.

173. !d.
174. !d.
175. !d.
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funding provisions were unconstitutional because they were vastly
underfunded. 176 Put simply, the Court required the legislature to provide
sufficient funds for each student in Ohio to have an opportunity for an
adequate education. 177
The Ohio Supreme Court did not require the legislature to take any
specific course of action. The majority made clear that it was not
advocating a "Robin Hood" approach, and stated that it did not support
placing spending ceilings on wealthier districts. 178 The Court did,
however, offer an admonition to the General Assembly: "[The General
Assembly] must create an entirely new [statewide] finance system; the
establishment, organization, and maintenance of public education are the
state's responsibility." 179 With that, the Court remanded DeRolph to the
trial court and retained jurisdiction until such time as appropriate
legislation was passed. The Court stayed the decision for twelve months
in order to give the legislature time to act upon its mandate.
The Court responded quickly to motions for clarification of its
holding in DeRolph I. First, it held that while property taxes could be
used as a part of the funding system, it could no longer be the primary
means of financing. 180 Second, the Court held that debt obligations
incurred under the State's unconstitutional forced borrowing program
were nonetheless valid if incurred before March 24, 1997. 181 The Court
further stated that the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, and not the
Ohio Supreme Court itself, would retain jurisdiction in the case. 182
* *"
Each justice voting with the majority concurred separately. 183 Justice

176. !d.
177. West, supra n. 127, at 291.
178. De Rolph I, 677 N .E.2d at 746; see also West, supra n. 127, at 291; McMillan, supra n. 30, at
780.
179. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747.
180. DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886,887 (Oh1o 1997).
181. !d.
182. !d. at 887-88.
183. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733. In addition to justice Douglas' concurrence discussed below,
some aspects of Justice Pfeifer's and Justice Resnick's concurrences are worth mentioning. Justice
Pfeifer highlighted the "unconscionable funding inequities," and stated that they were the result of a
flawed system, and not of a lack of commitment by the districts themselves. As Justice Pfeifer
explained, it was simply much more difficult for poor districts to yield funding, regardless of millage.
For example, in 1994 it required over 27 mills in East Cleveland to yield the amount of l mill in
neighboring Cuyahoga Heights. /d. at 780 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). Justice Resnick emphasized that
while funding need not be equal or even substantially equal across districts, there must be a threshold
funding amount provided by the state that gives each district the ability to provide an adequate
education. !d. at 779 (Resnick, )., concurring). Resnick also stressed that although educational
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Douglas' concurrence was significantly longer than the majority opinion.
Douglas began by discussing the history of education in Ohio, beginning
with legislation that actually predated the State's founding, and
continuing with a long discussion of the legislative history surrounding
the Ohio Constitution's Education Clause. 184 He then noted that,
contrary to the court of appeals holding, the Walter Court had not
determined whether education is a fundamental right in Ohio. 185
Douglas found this right to be implicit in the Ohio Constitution and in
Ohio's history. "To hold otherwise," he argued, "is to bury our head in
the sand." 186 Because Justice Douglas found education to be a
fundamental right, he applied a strict scrutiny analysis and determined
that the system violated the Equal Protection Clause of Section 2, Article
I of the Ohio Constitution. 187 "Local control ... in the Plaintiff districts is
a cruel illusion .... The fact that school districts have the 'ability' to
determine how dollars are spent ... is a hollow argument where there are
not sufficient funds .... " 188
Chief Justice Thomas Moyer wrote an equally strong dissent, joined
by conservative Justices Deborah Cook and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton. 189
The dissent parallels arguments later made by members of the General
Assembly. Chief Justice Moyer first argued that school funding was a
nonjusticiable political issue, and that the Ohio Supreme Court had
usurped the authority of the General Assembly. 190 "What constitutes a
'high quality' education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be
ascertained by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards." 191
In short, the dissent argued that the courts were neither equipped nor
empowered to make such decisions. Decisions regarding the level and
method of funding, Moyer argued, require policy choices and value
judgments that are appropriately left up to the legislature. 192
funding had increased since Walter, it was no longer based on an explicit assessment of the cost of an
education. Id. at 780 (Resnick,)., concurring). The legislature must first determine the cost of a basic
quality education, she argued, and then provide sufficient funds to provide that education. Id.
(Resnick,)., concurring).
184. Id. at 747-772 (Douglas,)., concurring).
185. Id. at 776 (Douglas, )., concurring). Although the question of whether education is a
fundamental right in Ohio had been a central point of contention between the trial and appellate
courts, the De Rolph I majority never decided the issue.
186. Id. (Douglas,)., concurring).
187. Id. (Douglas,)., concurring).
188. Id. (Douglas,)., concurring).
189. Id. at 782 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
190. I d. (Moyer, C.j., dissenting).
191. Id. at 785 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting) (citing Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178,1191 (111.1996)).
192. Id. at 784 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
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Having determined the issue to be nonjusticiable, the dissenting
justices nonetheless analyzed the issues presented in DeRolph and found
that the State's funding system did not violate the Education Clause.
Chief Justice Moyer pointed out that even plaintiffs' own expert had
testified that Ohio ranked eleventh nationally in per pupil education
spending. 193 Furthermore, Ohio ranked eighteenth nationally in studentteacher ratio, 194 and since 1980 increases in the foundation level of state
support had outpaced inflation by 60%. 195 Moyer quoted one expert as
testifying that it was "virtually indisputable" that Ohio's school finance
system was more equitable than it had been when Walter was decided in
1979. 196 Moyer also criticized the evidence as anecdotal and not
representative of Ohio's system as a whole. 197 "The system is not
unconstitutional because individual school buildings have fallen into
disrepair, or because individual school districts face funding
challenges." 198 Based on the totality of the evidence, the dissenters found
that the General Assembly had in fact discharged its duty to provide a
thorough and efficient system of public schools. 199

Iv.

DEROLPH I IN THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC, AND THE STATEHOUSE

The first DeRolph decision immediately met with strong responses
from the media, the public, and the legislature. On March 25, 1997, the
day following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision, the editorial page of
the Columbus Dispatch predicted that the Court would wreak havoc
upon Ohio's schools. 200 The editorial echoed what many political

193. Id. at 787 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting). In contrast, plaintiff, had argued that averages were
meaningless because Ohio was the third worst state nationwide in variance from the mean in per
pupil spending. Pls./Appellants' Reply Br. to the Sup. Ct. at 8, DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997)
(No. 94-CA-477), available at http://www.bricker.com (accessed )an. 10, 2005).
194. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 788 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
195. Id. at 787 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
196. ld. (Moyer, C.)., dissenting). This expert's testimony was directly countered by plaintiffs'
brief. "The State's expert witness' conclusion ... was reached only after manipulation of the data by
excluding approximately 30% of the school revenue ... excluding a number of pupils as large as the
entire student population of ten of our states, and weighing the largest district (Cleveland) equally
with the smallest." Pls.-Appellants' Reply Br. to the Sup. Ct. at 7, DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio
1997) (No. 94-CA-477), available at http://www.bricker.com (accessed )an. 10, 2005). Other experts
agreed that school funding had become more inequitable. Id. This is consistent with the trial court's
finding that Ohio ranked 48 1h among the states in the level of funding disparity. Id.
197. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 792-795 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
198. ld. at 793 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting); but see supra n. 105 (stating that the DeRolph plaintiff
districts were representative of a much larger group of districts throughout Ohio).
199. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 788 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
200. See Editorial, Judicial Lawmaking High Court Wreaks Havoc in Ohio Schools, Columbus
Dispatch 14A (Mar. 25, 1997).
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conservatives and the DeRolph I dissenters had been thinking all along:
that the decision was simply the product of an overreaching, activist
court; that the admittedly awful conditions of some plaintiff districts
were not representative of the entire Ohio school system; and that the
courts had neither the institutional competency nor the legal authority to
make such determinations.Z 01 Indeed, the decision was greeted with
proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over school funding cases, to
ignore the Supreme Court's orders, or even to impeach one or more of
the justices. 202 One law professor even suggested in the Columbus
Dispatch that Ohio amend its Constitution to prevent further judicial
involvement in school finance. 203
The Court's mandate to provide additional funding concerned many.
Businesses feared the DeRolph holding would require massive tax
increases, particularly on businesses and industries that were already
feeling a significant tax crunch. 204 As the legislature began to look for
sources of additional school funding, other areas of spending, including
higher education, were in danger of large budget cuts.Z 05 Although it did
not address the propriety of the holding, a statement released by the Ohio
Chamber of Commerce on the day of the Supreme Court's decision
foreshadowed the political battle that would be fought in upcoming
judicial elections. "As a long-standing, vocal advocate of tying state
funding to performance, the Chamber hopes there will be a greater sense
of accountability. . . . Simply throwing more money at an existing
problem has never eliminated that problem." 206
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in DeRolph I met with a mixed
reaction from legislators and the governor. Most lawmakers accepted the
premise that the Court was within its authority to hold the system
unconstitutional. As one legislative staff member told the author, "the
Court does have the right to examine all aspects of the Constitution, and

201. Id.
202. See e.g. David N. Mayer, Editorial, Ohio's School Funding Dilemma: Is the Court 011 the
Right Track? Part 2 of2. No: Majority of Justices on Unconstitutional Ground, Columbus Dispatch 9A
(May 15, 2000).
203. David N. Mayer, Editorial Comment, Columbus Dispatch SA (Mar. 18, 1999) (stating that
"a constitutional amendment may be required to keep the judiciary in its proper bounds and to save
representative democracy in Ohio").
204. See Alan johnson, Electric Industry Deregulation, School Funding Tied, Group Says,
Columbus Dispatch 2C (Apr. 11, 1997) (stating that a shift away from the property tax could lead to
higher excise taxes on electricity, but that the utilities were already burdened by unequal tax
treatment).
205. Telephone Interview with Herb Asher, Professor of Political Science and Advisor to the
President of Ohio State University (Apr. 18, 2003).
206. PR Newswire Association, Inc., Ohio Chamber Identifies Education and Business
Opportunities in Court Ruling (Mar. 24, 1997) (available at LEXIS, News library, PR Newswire file).
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since education is specifically mentioned in the Constitution, they do
have the right and the authority to make this decision." 207 This theme has
echoed in the statements of many lawmakers even through the most
recent DeRolph decision. 208 Many legislators, however, also expressed
doubts about the propriety of the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling.
According to William Batchelder, former Speaker Pro Tempore of the
Ohio House of Representatives, "A majority of legislators had a real
reservation about the Supreme Court getting involved to the extent that
they did. Our view in Ohio has generally been that the Court does not
have the power to fiddle with formula numbers." 209
Like some members of the media and the public, the most
conservative members of the Republican legislative caucuses responded
to DeRolph I by proposing to strip the courts of jurisdiction in school
funding cases, even suggesting a constitutional amendment. Some have
suggested to the author that these proposals were merely "off the cuff
remarks" picked up (and blown out of proportion) by the press.Z 10
Others, however, have stated that these proposals were much more
serious. According to Batchelder, "There was considerable support for an
amendment that would give the legislature the final say on school finance
issues." 211 There apparently was also some support for impeaching
Republican Justice Paul Pfeifer, who along with Republican Justice
Andrew Douglas had sided with Democratic Justices Francis Sweeney
and Alice Robie Resnick to form the DeRolph majority. 212 As political
scientist Lawrence Baum has noted, however, "None [of these
suggestions] came anywhere near enactment, which suggests that ... they
were mostly symbolic." 213
207. Email from Marianne White, Legislative Aide to Ohio State Senator Robert A. Gardner, to
Larry j. Obhof (Apr. 29, 2003) (copy on file with author) (emphasis in original).
208. See e.g. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, Chief Policy Advisor to Governor
Robert Taft (May 6, 2003) ("The Governor does not question that the Court has the authority to rule
on constitutional questions. He feels that the system is constitutional, but recognizes that the
Supreme Court has the right to make that decision."). As another policymaker has told the author,
"The people of Perry County have a right to argue their case, and they did so. You can't begrudge
them that."
209. Telephone Interview with William Batchelder, supra n. 116.
210. Email fi·orn Marianne White, supra n. 207.
211. Telephone Interview with William Batchelder, supra n. 116.
212. !d. (stating that some legislators supported impeaching justice Pfeifer because the Ohio
Supreme Court did not have the constitutional authority to make a number of the decisions that it
had). /ustices pfeifer and Douglas in particular incurred the anger of conservative legislators, who
were disappointed in their fellow Republicans' more activist judicial philosophy. Douglas, however,
was nearing the state's mandatory retirement age of 70, and was never considered for impeachment.
justice Pfeifer therefore bore the brunt of the legislators' disenchantment with the DeRolph majority.
213. Email from Lawrence Baum, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, to
Larry). Obhof (May 6, 2003) (copy on file with author).
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Some Ohioans praised the decision as an historic opportunity to
shape the future of education. 214 Others sharply criticized suggestions
that the Ohio Constitution be amended. This sentiment was captured by
an editorial in the Columbus Dispatch: "Would the Constitution then
read, 'The General Assembly shall not secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the state'? . . . 'The Supreme
Court shall not have the function of judicial review'? ... I say, 'Shame on
you!'"21s
Despite the more evenly distributed and more polarized split in
public opinion, legal scholarship has been overwhelmingly supportive of
the Ohio Supreme Court and, by extension, the plaintiffs' cause. 216
Publications such as the Harvard Law Review lauded the DeRolph
decision as "a step in the right direction," 217 and some scholars even
questioned whether the Court had gone far enough. 218 Indeed, for some
the primary point of contention has been what the Ohio Supreme Court
did not say, particularly by failing to declare education in Ohio to be a
fundamental right. 219

A.

The Legislative Response to DeRolph I

A flurry of legislation followed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
DeRolph I, but DeRolph was certainly not the only factor influencing the
General Assembly. Governor George V oinovich had already proposed a
number of statewide school reforms, including a push towards statewide
testing and fiscal and academic accountability measures. Indeed,
throughout the litigation legislators have focused not only on complying
with DeRolf, but also toward solving various non-monetary problems as
well. "DeRolph is important," the Chair of the Ohio House Education

214. See e.g.
Should Not Cower,

Karen Duty, Editorial Comment, Hducation Opportunity Knocks. Politicians
Columbus Dispatch 11A (Apr. 5, 1997).
215. Bruce Ebert, Editorial Comment, Unequal School Funding Shouldn't be Legalized,
Columbus Dispatch 1OA (Apr. 23, 1997) (emphasis added).
216. Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw searches, for example, routinely turn up dozens of law review
articles and notes mentioning DeRolph, less than 10-15% of which are unfavorable to the decision or
criticize the court for being too "activist."
217. Student Author, Ohio Supreme Court Declares State's Public School Financing System
Unconstitutional, Ill Harv. L. Rev. 855, R57 (I 998).
218. Sec Haynes, supra n. II, at 634 (stating that the Ohio Supreme Court "mistakenly stopped
at the point of declaring the system unconstitutional and turned the entire situation over to the
c;eneral Assembly with no direction as to how to establish a new system").
219. Sec id. at 632 ("the court avoided deciding the issue of whether education is a fundamental
right ... [this decision] may have been expedient for the court but leaves a critical issue unresolved");
see also Winterhof, supra n. 20, at 1287-88 (arguing that the DeRolph Court should have explicitly
declared whether or not education is a fundamental right in Ohio, because prior decisions of the
Ohio courts are unclear).
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Committee recently told the author, "but it is not the only issue that the
Education Committee deals with." 220
The Ohio General Assembly thus responded to DeRolph I not with
the "complete systematic overhaul" of the school finance system required
by the Ohio Supreme Court, but with a series of legislation aimec at
solving a number of problems affecting the State's education system. The
legislation passed in this period reflects the differing views among the
legislators themselves as to which problems were most significant. One
legislative aide commented, "Legislators were all over the place when
trying to determine what was the most significant problem." 221 Some
lawmakers wanted more academic accountability on the part of school
districts; some wanted more fiscal accountability; others believed that the
State needed to alter its funding formula to comply with the DeRolph
decision itself? 22
The diversity of views in the legislature led to some basic changes in
the structure of legislative committees. Four new education-related
committees were established in the Ohio Senate-one to deal with
academic accountability; one to deal with the fiscal issues; one to
reexamine the State's funding formula; and one to deal with other issues,
including the funding of facilities. 223 This new committee structure
allowed individual legislators to focus their efforts toward the areas they
felt presented the most pressing problems. 224 The flood oflegislation that
began two months after DeRolph therefore reflected each of these
concerns.
In May 1997 the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 102, which
created the Ohio Schools Facilities Commission. 225 The commission was
charged with assessing facility needs and conditionally approving repair
and construction projects. Senate Bill 102 also established the Emergency
School Building Repair Program to fund districts' urgent needs. 226 A
similar program, known as the Big Eight Program, was set up for school
districts that had roughly 12,000 students or more. 227 In all, the
legislature appropriated $300 million for capital improvements
statewide228 -a hefty sum, but only a fraction of the $10.2 billion in need
220. Telephone Interview with Arlene Setzer, Ohio State Representative and Chair of the
House Education Committee (Apr. 29, 2003).
221. Email from Marianne White, supra n. 207.
222. Id.
223. ld.
224. Id.
225. See Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 102, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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identified by the Court in DeRolph I.
The biennial budget bill for fiscal years 1998-1999 was signed on
June 30, 1997. It made adjustments to the basic aid formula and
increased equity aid and funding for textbooks. 229 The new budget also
provided additional funding for facilities and for the SchoolNet and
SchoolNet Plus technology programs, and created and provided the
initial funding for a Disability Access Program.Z 30
On August 22, 1997, Governor George Voinovich signed two
accountability-based bills into law-House Bill 412 and Senate Bill 55.
House Bill 412, known as the School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
required school districts to maintain budget reserves and required set
asides for textbooks, building maintenance and emergencies.Z 31 Senate
Bill 55, the "Academic Accountability Bill," increased high school
graduation requirements from 18 to 21 credit hours, made modifications
to the State proficiency tests, established standards for "school district
report cards" (which rated school districts' effectiveness), and instituted
the "Fourth-Grade Guarantee," requiring students to pass a fourth-grade
proficiency test before they could advance to the fifth grade.Z 32
The passage of House Bill 650 in February 1998, with amendments
added by House Bill 770 in June 1998,233 altered the State's basic funding
formula. 234 The bill assigned a base cost per pupil of $4,063 for fiscal year
1999, to be adjusted for inflation at an annual rate of 2.8%? 35 The bill's
stated goal was to "establish a new system for funding education," but no
fundamental changes were made to either the funding system itself or the
formula for dispersing state aid.Z 36 By any objective measure, the changes
made by the legislature in House Bill650 fell short of meeting DeRolph Ts
mandate that the State establish an entirely new finance system. Despite
significant efforts to improve the State's education system, it seemed as
though the legislature had not focused enough on the school finance
system itself to solve the specific problems addressed by the Ohio
Supreme Court in DeRolph I.

1.

"Issue 2 ": A failed attempt to fund the schools
The State legislature, led by conservative Republicans who often
229. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 215, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997).
230. ld.
231.

See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 412, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997).

232. See Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 55, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997).
233. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 770, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1998).
234. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 650, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1998).
235.
236.

See DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1005-07 (discussing Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 3317.012).
See also Haynes, supra n. II, at 637.
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campaigned on an anti-tax platform, was reluctant to raise taxes in order
to meet the DeRolph Court's mandate. It instead placed a one-cent sales
tax increase on the May 1998 primary ballot that employed constitutional
provision allowing the legislature to delegate its lawmaking authority on
education matters. 237 The proposed tax increase, known on the ballot as
"Issue 2," was projected to raise roughly $1.1 billion annually, to be
divided roughly equally between increased spending for schools and
property tax relief. 238
Governor V oinovich publicly argued that, as a philosophical matter,
the taxpayers should be allowed to vote on any proposed major tax
increase. He called this process "participating in the debate." 239 The
editorial staffs of major newspapers, however, were more skeptical of the
motives behind Issue 2. A Columbus Dispatch editorial asserted that
"Issue 2 literally asks voters to approve what the governor and the
legislature could have done by themselves but didn't .... [T]hey cloak
this public referendum with nice-sounding rhetoric about 'letting the
people decide' . . . constructing an elaborate and confusing scheme to
election-proof themselves .... "240
In truth, Issue 2 appears to have been a pragmatic compromise
between different wings of the Republican Party, which controlled both
houses of the Ohio legislature by wide margins, rather than an attempt to
shift responsibility to the voters. Conservative legislators wanted Issue 2
on the ballot because they saw it as a referendum on the DeRolph
decision itself. Some legislative leaders did not believe that voters
supported the decision, and they wanted to bring the Ohio Supreme
Court and its jurisprudence into the public debate. 241 Perhaps more
importantly, a strong anti-tax wing of the legislature had the power to
resist proposed major tax increases. "It probably would have failed on the
floor," notes one legislative leader. "I don't think many people seriously
believed that a tax increase would get through the legislature." 242 Issue 2
had to be put on the ballot, or there would be no chance for a sales tax
increase at all.
On March 25, 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court's one-year deadline
237. Lee Leonard, Editorial, Issue 2 Vote Will be Historic in More Ways than One, Columbus
Dispatch 7 A (May 4, 1998).
23il. Some disparaged even this aspect of the proposal, and argued that it would lead to no real
tax cuts at all because for most taxpayers the decrease in local property taxes would be offset by an
increase in federal income taxes. See Barbara Carmen, Real Costs of Issue 2 Can't be Heard over the
Porker's Squeals, Columbus Dispatch I D (May 3, 1998).
239. Leonard, supra n. 237, at 7A.
240. !d.
241. Telephone Interview with William Batchelder, supra n. I IIi.
242.

ld.
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passed without comment from the Court or from Judge Lewis, 243 perhaps
because they were waiting to see the fate of Issue 2. It would prove to be
an ill-fated quest. Issue 2 had the public support of most legislative
leaders and a popular governor, but it did not have the support of the
DeRolph plaintiffs, most school administrators and educators, or
organized labor. 244 The Coalition and its allies in the labor and education
establishments decried Issue 2 as a "ploy designed to disguise the state's
failure to overhaul the system" as required by DeRolph I. 245 The Coalition
also expressed doubts that the money would be used for education.
The Coalition's opposition to Issue 2 was just the tip of the iceberg.
Democratic voters were wary of voting for a proposal made by the
Republican leadership, and many saw an increased sales tax as regressive.
A substantial number of voters from both parties, moreover, simply did
not want a tax increase. 246 Others were angered by the legislature's
refusal to raise taxes itself. 247 Like the DeRolph plaintiffs, many also
doubted that the money, if raised, would actually be spent on
education. 248 Still others, including Nathan DeRolph, in whose name the
case was brought, saw Issue 2 as being too little, too late. 249 ''I'm
suspicious," stated one reporter shortly before the election. "When have
we ever seen politicians pushing a tax increase for schools and educators
opposing one?" 250 Most voters wondered the same thing. On May 5,

243. Nine Years of Litigation. Columbus Dispatch 6A (May 12, 2000).
244. See Carmen, supra n. 238, at ID (noting that politicians supported the tax increase but
educators did not).
245. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6. It is unclear what alternate course of
action the DeRolph plaintiffs would have preferred. Even to this day the Coalition argues for a
"complete systematic overhaul," but refuses to suggest specific funding levels or methods that might
satisfy this burden.
246. Indeed, many voters were skeptical that increased funding was even necessary. This effect
is compounded by the fact that most legislators are reluctant to ask their constituents for statewide
tax increases. As one legislator has told the author, "My constituents don't want money going to
Columbus, and I don't want to tell my constituents that $I will leave the district and less than $1 will
come back."
247. See e.g. Afi Odelia E. Scruggs, Vote Against Issue 2 Tough, but Right Move, Plain Dealer 1B
(May 6, 1998) ("' didn't like voting against Issue 2. I think public schools are taking a financial
beating here in Ohio ... [but] instead of coming up with the bucks, [the General Assembly] sat back
and passed them.").
248. See e.g., Darrel Rowland, Poll Shows Voters Skeptical of Sales-Tax Ballot Proposal,
Columbus Dispatch 2A (May 3, 1998). One voter summed up this position: "Everything that comes
up there's supposed to be so much allotted for schools, but it never gets there," he said. "When
someone can come up with some concrete evidence that all this m(mey's going to be allotted [to
schools], then I'll vote for it." !d.
249. See Rita Price, Fundilzg-Suit Namesake Still Fightirtg for Schools, Columbus Dispatch 1A
(May 17, 1998).
250. Carmen, supra n. 238, at 1D. Some political scientists who study Ohio politics have
underscored the impact of the Coalition's efforts in defeating Issue 2. See Telephone Interview with
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1998, Issue 2 failed by a margin of four-to-one, one of the worst defeats
of any ballot issue in Ohio's history. 251 In August 1998, with the $1.1
billion in projected aid from Issue 2 no longer forthcoming, the litigants
returned to court.
V.

DEROLPH V. STATE REVISITED

Beginning August 24, 1999, Judge Lewis held a nine-day hearing to
determine if the State had met its burden of making Ohio's school
funding system constitutional. 252 The State argued that although its
reliance on property taxes had not changed, the statutes passed since
DeRolph I had achieved the constitutionally required minimum of equity
and adequacy in school funding. Judge Lewis disagreed, and held that the
State had failed to implement a systematic overhaul of Ohio's school
funding system and that the system therefore remained
unconstitutional. 253
The State appealed Judge Lewis' ruling directly to the Ohio Supreme
Court. In its brief, the State discussed each area of concern expressed by
the Supreme Court in DeRolph I and outlined the legislation that had
been enacted to remedy those problems. The defense also focused on the
absolute size of the education budget. "[W]ell over 50% of State revenue
in the capital and non-capital budget now goes to primary, secondary, or
college education .... [T]he Department of Education now receives more
State money than any other agency or department in the state." 254 The
legislature, defendants argued, had not only exhaustively debated and
carefully studied Ohio's school finance system, but had also determined
the cost of an adequate education and aggressively funded its initiatives.
According to the State defendants, the new system was thorough because
it guaranteed sufficient resources to provide an adequate education to
every child in the State, and efficient because it spent the taxpayers'

Herb Asher, supra n. 205 ("Issue 2 could have won, but its major opponents were principals,
superintendents, and school boards .... Its chances of success just got worse and worse as would-be
supporters rejected it.").
251. Sec Lee Leonard, Editorial, Issue 2 Vote Provides Plenty of Lessons ji>r Legislators,
Columbus Dispatch 9A (May II, 1998).
252. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the state bore the burden of proof on remand, and was
therefore required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional requirements
spelled out in DeRolph I had been satisfied. See DeRolph v. State, 699 N.E.2d 518,518-19 (1998). The
trial court's inquiry was limited to analysis under the Education Clause; the Supreme Court
instructed judge Lewis that the remand did not involve an analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause. !d.
253. DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125,297 (1999).
254. Br. of the State Appellants at 2, 11, DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570).
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money in a responsible manner. 255
The plaintiffs, for their part, argued that the legislature had
retained-and in some respects exacerbated-the unconstitutional
system outlined in DeRolph !. 256 They argued that the State had not
presented evidence of any net increase in school funding; 257 that the
methodology used by the State's expert in determining an adequate
funding level was "junk science," and at any rate was arbitrarily lowered
by the legislature; 258 and that the General Assembly had ignored the
Supreme Court's ban of forced borrowing by simply reenacting
unconstitutional statutes and changing their names. 259
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' complaints, the Ohio government
had taken important steps toward remedying the system's deficiencies.
Governor George V oinovich, who now hoped to salvage his legacy as the
"Education Governor," continued working with the legislature to
improve the system. In December 1998, the General Assembly allocated
an additional $505 million for school facilities.Z 60
Beginning in 1999, newly-elected Governor Robert Taft began
implementing his own plans for Ohio's schools, seeking both to comply
with DeRolph and to actualize his own policy agenda. Governor Taft
accepted the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's ruling and recognized
that more resources were necessary. 261 Like the legislature, though, he
saw a number of problems besides just a lack of resources and
accountability.Z 62 Taft swept in a series of reforms that focused on what
he considered to be the root causes of poor educational attainment (some
of which coincided with problems highlighted by the DeRolph Court).
These included a lack of adequate facilities; a lack of early educational
development that hindered educational attainment at later stages; and a
need for greater leadership and curriculum development within the
schools. 263
On June 29, 1999, Governor Taft signed into law House Bills 282 and
283. House Bill 282, which was Ohio's first budget exclusively dedicated
to education, made adjustments to the per pupil formula amount and the

255. See id. at 2.
256. Br. of Pis./ Appellees at 3, DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570), available
at http:/ /www.bricker.com (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
257. !d.
258. Jd. at 6-7.
259. Jd. at 14-17.
260. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 850, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1998).
261. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208.
262. !d.
263. Jd.
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funding formula and provided additional funding for technology. 264
House Bill 283 allocated the State budget surplus toward education and
appropriated $325.7 million in surplus money toward school
construction and repair? 65 On November 2, 1999, only two weeks before
the Ohio Supreme Court heard arguments in DeRolph II, the voters
authorized the issuance of general obligation bonds to pay for school
facilities. 266 In total, the legislation passed between DeRolph I and
DeRolph II provided nearly $2 billion toward school facilities. 267
Additionally, the Court admitted evidence that Senate Bill 192 (signed
into law after oral arguments had been heard) allocated money that was
received by the State pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement between the states and tobacco-producing companies. This
committed an additional $2.5 billion for school construction and repair
over the next twelve years. 268
The General Assembly also implemented programs that did not alter
the funding system but were nonetheless important steps toward
providing an adequate education. First, in March 1999, the State initiated
Governor Taft's "OhioReads" program, which provided grants for tutors
to assist children with their reading. 269 Although this program was not
formulated in response to DeRolph I and did not alter the funding
system, it was an important part of Governor Taft's efforts to eliminate
the root causes of low educational attainment. 270 Second, the legislature
not only required districts to develop comprehensive school safety plans,
but also set specific penalties for violent offenses in or near schools. 271
A.

The Ohio Supreme Court - Round II

On May 11, 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court once again held Ohio's
school funding system unconstitutional. 272 Although the State had made
264. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 282, I23d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1999).
265. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. 283, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1999); see also Nine
Years of Litigation, supra n. 243, at 6A.
266. This issue had been placed on the ballot by the legislature. See Ohio Substitute Sen. Jt. Res.
1, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1999). The authorization of bond issuance does not illustrate a
significant change among voting behavior since the failure of Issue 2. The various reasons for Issue
2's failure have been discussed at length above; these elements were not present in the low-publicity
campaign for bond authorization. Bond authorizations typically fare well with the voters and, in
contrast to Issue 2, the bond issue enjoyed the support of the education community.
267. Haynes, supra n. 11, at 639.
268. DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1004, lOll; sec Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 192, l23d Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. ( 1999).
269. See Ohio Amend. Substitute H. I, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. ( 1999).
270. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208.
271. See Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. I, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. ( 1999).
272. See De Rolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1022.
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progress, the Court found that the system still suffered from an overreliance on property taxes, unfunded legislative mandates, an inadequate
basic aid formula, and forced borrowing.
Justice Alice Robie Resnick, writing for the same four-justice
majority as that in DeRolph I, commended the State for making limited
progress. The Court noted the General Assembly's efforts to ensure that
education was no longer a budgetary residual, and despite serious
misgivings, gave the legislature the benefit of the doubt that its efforts
were genuine. 273 The Court also recognized the significant recent
investments by the State in facilities construction and repair. Citing a
study by Achieve, Inc., however, the majority stated that too many
children still attended classes in dreadfully substandard facilities.Z 74 In
fact, despite the State's increasing efforts to fund facilities, the amount of
funding necessary for facility repair and construction was estimated to
have risen from $10.2 billion in 1990 to $16.5 billion in 1997. 275 The
majority thus found the $300 million that had been appropriated for
capital improvements to be insufficient. 276
The Ohio Supreme Court also found that none of the factors that
contributed to the unconstitutionality of the system in DeRolph I had
been eliminated. According to the majority, the problem of over-reliance
on property taxes, which had been central to the DeRolph I decision, had
not changed at all. 277 The legislature had failed to specifically address this
problem, except through the failed Issue 2 ballot proposal, and instead
sought to minimize its importance by focusing on the other problems
addressed in DeRolph I. The Court found the State's arguments
unconvincing and held that the problem of over-reliance on property
taxes must be dealt with independently. 278

273. Sec id. at I 008 ("We give defendants the benefit of the doubt ... that they have not merely
disguised residual budgeting. However, we cannot totally discount the evidence that the actual cost
might have been the deciding factor in selecting the method used to determine the base cost of an
adequate education.").
274. In November 1998, outgoing (;overnor George Voinovich requested a study by a group of
experb, Achieve, Inc., in order to provide incoming Governor Robert Taft and the legislature with a
candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Ohio's reforms. The report highlighted Ohio's
need for facilities improvements; it noted that the (;eneral Accounting Office ranked Ohio dead last
among the fifty states in the condition of its school facilities. See Achieve, Inc., A New Compact for
Ohio's Schools: A Report to Ohio's Hducational Policy Leaders 8 (1999).
275. DcRolph fl, 728 N.E.2d at 1009. The Court also accepted testimony from the Executive
Director of the Ohio Facilities Commission that at the current funding rate it would take 55 years to
correct the deficit. I d. at I 0 ll.
276. Sec DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1020.
277. See id. at 1013 ("this aspect of the former system persists in the state's current funding
plan, wholly unchanged") (emphasis in original).
278. Id. at 1015.
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The DeRolph II majority further stated that recent legislation would
in fact exacerbate some of the problems cited by the Court in DeRolph I.
A phase-out of the inventory tax could actually increase reliance on local
property taxes, and the unfunded mandates of House Bill 412 and Senate
Bill 55 (which had anticipated a one-cent sales tax increase) would force
districts to levy additional taxes in order to satisfy set -aside
requirements. 279 The Court held that these unfunded mandates must be
addressed and immediately funded. 280 The majority also suggested that
the new formula of House Bill 650 could create additional types of
"phantom revenue." Property valuation increases under the new system
would cause the millage rate to be reduced. 281 The majority reasoned that
this would cause some districts to lose equalization payments and would,
in turn, force those districts to vote for increased millage every time
reappraisal occurred.Z 82 This was obviously something the Court wanted
to avoid.
The DeRolph II majority found that the basic aid formula designed in
response to DeRolph I had structural deficiencies and did not reflect the
per pupil amount necessary to fund an adequate education. 283 The
formula was, in fact, almost identical to its predecessor.Z 84 The Court also
had serious misgivings about the manner in which the State's funding
formula was designed. The legislature had hired Dr. John G. Augenblick
to determine the cost of providing an adequate education, but then
modified Augenblick's formula downward without explanation. 285 At
least one expert opined that this was done solely to come up with a lower
number. 286 The Court also questioned the State's JUStification of a
"phase-in" period (i.e., the legislature did not plan to fund the fiscal year
1999 base level of $4,063 until fiscal year 2001) when it was currently
funding below the level the legislature had deemed to be the base amount
for an adequate education. 287
The last significant problem from DeRolph I was the State's "forced
borrowing" program. Although the Spending Reserve Loan Fund was
being phased out, the Court remained concerned that set -asides required

280.

/d. at 1014.
Id. at 1021.

281.

Jd. at 1016.

279.

282. I d.
283.

/d. at 1021.

284.

/d. at I 006.

285. /d. at I 006-07. These changes reduced the base cost from $4,269 for fiscal year 1999 to
$4,063. Jd.
286. Jd. at 1007.
287.

/d.
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by new legislation would lead to additional borrowing. 288 While noting
the similarities between the new School Solvency Assistance Fund and
the former Emergency School Assistance Loan Program, the Court did
not state, as plaintiffs had hoped, that the new program was merely a
reenactment of the unconstitutional former program. 289 It did, however,
make clear that "any system that entails borrowing from future funds to
meet ordinary expenses is not a thorough and efficient system." 290
The Ohio Supreme Court once again declined to fashion its own
remedy for the school funding system. The Court acknowledged and
quickly dismissed plaintiffs' request that the Court simply order that the
foundation amount be set in excess of $5,000 per pupi1. 291 Such
involvement, the majority stated, was not the role of the judiciary. "Our
role, as we have declared it in past cases, is to decide issues of
constitutionality-not to legislate .... "292 The Court did, however, finally
take the opportunity to define "thorough and efficient." Noting that the
concept itself is not static, and that it would be impossible to list all of the
possible components of such a system, the Court expanded upon the
standard set out in Miller:
A thorough system means that each and every school district has
enough funds to operate. An efficient system means one in which each
and every school district in the state has an ample number of teachers,
sound buildings that are in compliance with state building and fire
codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an
. I opportumty.
. 293·
educat10na
Once again, the Court emphasized that the attainment of such a
system was a purpose expressly made statewide. 294 The Supreme Court
maintained jurisdiction and gave the General Assembly a little more than
one year to make the necessary changes to the State's funding system? 95
Justices Douglas and Pfeifer again joined the majority with
concurring opinions. Douglas noted that the local share of funding had
increased vis-a-vis the state share since DeRolph I, while over the same
time period the General Assembly had given tax refunds of nearly $1.3
billion. 296 According to Douglas, that money could have and should have

288. See id. at I 012.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 1013.
291. Id. at l 003.

!d.
Id. at 995, 1001.
294. Id. at 995.
295. See id. at 1022.
296. Id. at 1025 (Douglas, j., concurring).
292.

293.
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been spent on education. 297 Justice Pfeifer's concurrence reminded the
defendants that the case was primarily about school funding and not
about setting new academic standards: "[S]etting minimum requirements
for the availability of modern textbooks and computers does not meet the
mandate of [the Education Clause] when those standards are simply not
,298
me.
t
Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Deborah Cook wrote separate
dissents. Moyer argued that the Ohio Supreme Court had not only
assigned itself veto power over the policy determinations made by the
General Assembly, but also simply replaced one ambiguous criterion
with another. 299 For example, the Chief Justice reasoned that whether a
district has "enough" funds or an "ample" number of teachers is entirely
subjective. 300 Justice Cook agreed, and argued that the Education Clause
is so vague that it is incapable of meaningful enforcement. 301 Cook felt
that this left only the General Assembly with the authority to make the
policy decisions necessary to satisfy the clause. 302
Chief Justice Moyer, again, argued that the deficiencies of individual
schools did not themselves demonstrate the failure of the entire statewide
system. 303 The majority, however, had drawn precisely this inference.
Nor did the Chief Justice accept the assertion that the Education Clause
requires a state-funded system of public schools. 304 He pointed out that
nolhing in the Ohio Constitution precludes a system in which local
school districts are partly responsible for funding schools, and that any
decision to the contrary would be inconsistent with the history of
education in Ohio. 305 Quoting his own dissent from DeRolph I, Moyer
reiterated that the judicial branch is neither equipped nor empowered to
make policy decisions regarding school finance. 306 The Chief Justice

297. See id. at 1025-26 (Douglas, J., concurring).
298. I d. at 1028 (Pfeifer,)., concurring); see also id. at 102'! (Pfeifer,]., concurring) (stating that
the Court's decision in DeRolph II "is not about high standards," but rather about funding an
adequate education).
299. Id. at 1030-31 (Moyer, C.]., dissenting).
300. Id. (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
301. Id. at 1036 (Cook,)., dissenting).
302. Id. (Cook,)., dissenting); see also Mary]. Amos, De Rolph v. State: Who /ieally Won Ohio's
School Funding Battle?, 30 Cap. U. L. Rev. 153, 172 (2002) (stating that justice Cook finds Ohio's
Education Clause so vague that she believes only the (;eneral Assembly should be permitted to make
the policy determinations necessary to satisfy its requirements).
303. DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1031 (Moyer, C.j., dissenting).
304. ld. (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
305. !d. at 1031-32 (Moyer, C.]., dissenting).
306. Id. at 1029 (Moyer, C.j., dissenting) (citing Dc/iolph /, 677 N.E.2d at 785-S6 (Moyer, C.).,
dissenting)); see also id. at 1035 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting) (staling that the majority's decision in
DeRolph II is legally unwarranted and inappropriate).
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emphatically argued that the majority's decision in DeRolph II, as in
DeRolph I, overstepped the bounds of judicial review and was an
impermissible attempt at judicial legislation. 307
Some legal commentators have questioned whether DeRolph II can
even be termed a victory for the plaintiffs. 308 In the end, the Ohio
Supreme Court granted plaintiffs only one of eight remedies they had
requested. 309 The majority not only did not hold education to be a
fundamental right, but failed to even address the issue. 310 Importantly,
the Court also refused to establish a "market basket" of programs and
services, determine its own funding formula, or issue an interim funding
order to direct the expenditure of funds. The DeRolph plaintiffs had
requested all of these things. 311 DeRolph II is thus perhaps best viewed
not as a "victory" or a "loss" for the plaintiffs, but rather as an assertive
restatement by the Court of the principles it outlined in DeRolph I.
VI.

SCHOOL FUNDING, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, AND THE BALLOT BOX

Ohio Congressman Ted Strickland, who had filed an amicus brief in
support of the plaintiffs, seemed optimistic on the day of the DeRolph II
decision: "I think we're going to look back at this time a few years from
now and we're going to be very happy at what the court's done here. I
think it's going to result in good things for the state of Ohio and for our
kids." 312 Others criticized the State legislature for not having complied
with the Ohio Supreme Court's first ruling. 313 Some signs, moreover,
pointed to the practical necessity of the Court's holding. For example,
even as the litigants awaited the Court's decision an Ohio Department of
Education Study revealed that only 31 of 607 school districts in Ohio
were "operating effectively." 314
DeRolph II was met with disappointment by many lawmakers,
including the leaders of both the Ohio House of Representatives and the
307. See id. at 1035 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
308. See e.g. Amos, supra n. 302, at 153 (arguing that because the plaintiffs did not get most of
the remedies sought, they did not really "win" DeRolph II).
309.

ld. at 173.

310. ld. at 153.
311. See Br. of Pls./ Appellees at 45-50, DeRolph II, 728 N.F.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570),
available at http://www.bricker.com (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
312. Reaction Swift, Strong to State Court Decision, Dayton Daily News 7A (May 12, 2000).
313. See e.g. Andrew G. Benson, Editorial, Ohio's School Funding Dilemma: Is the Court on the
Right Track? Part I of 2. Yes: Legislature Is Failing to Do the Job Needed, Columbus Dispatch 9A
(May 15, 2000) (stating that the legislature's efforts to fix the funding system were akin to wrapping
broken machinery with duct tape and wire-"too much duct tape and too few new parts").
314. Safier, supra n. 66, at 996 (citing Local News (WMUB 88.5 NPR Peb. 28, 2000) (radio
broadcast)).
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Senate. 315 Although some in the media remained optimistic, most of the
commentary following DeRolph II was also decidedly negative. Even
before the Supreme Court's decision, editorial pages decried the trial
court's holding and chided Judge Lewis for ignoring the State's efforts in
support of primary and secondary education. 316 One even likened
DeRolph II to a ransom note: "Send more money or else." 317
Most of the arguments against DeRolph II were based on the doctrine
of the separation of powers. Ohio Senate President Richard Finan and
Senate Majority Legal Counsel April Williams likened Ohio's
government to a three-legged stool consisting of the legislature, the
gove;nor, and the courts. 318 "If one leg gets longer than the other,
government, like a stool, becomes imbalanced and unstable." 319 Finan
and Williams argued that recent Supreme Court decisions, including
DeRolph I and DeRolph II, had ignored legislative intent and put the stool
on a slippery slope. 320 Some took this argument much further. One
commentator decried the Ohio Supreme Court as a "super-legislature,"
and argued for the removal of judges that had usurped the legislature's
function. 321 At least one law professor publicly called for the Ohio House
of Representatives to begin impeaching judges who encroach on the

315. Former Governor (and current United States Senator) George Voinovich strongly
disagreed with the court's holding, and argued that significant reforms had already been made in the
years since the suit was filed. Reaction Swift, Strong to State Court Decision, supra n. 312. Ohio Senate
President Richard H. Finan and Ohio House Speaker joAnn Davidson recognized that more would
need to be done, but asserted that the issue was not merely one of money. "Republicans remain
committed to improving the overall quality of education in this state, not simply focusing on
funding. We look forward to working with members of the legislature in the coming months to meet
the mandates of this most recent court decision." !d.
316. Sec e.g. Editorial, School Funding Courts Must Observe Separation of Powers, Columbus
Dispatch 12A (Mar. 3, 1999). The editorial points to an increase in per pupil student aid from $2,636
to $3,663 between 1991 and 1998. It also focuses on Ohio's national rank in a number of funding
categories, nearly all of which place Ohio near the middle nationwide. The courts, the editorial
argued, were giving the state no credit for its efforts.
317. PR Newswire Association, Inc., DeRolph II: A New Ransom Note Declares Ohio
Roundtable (May 11, 2000) (available at LEXIS, News library, PR Newswire file).
318. See Richard H. Finan & April M. Williams, Government Is a Three-Legged Stool, 32 U.
Toledo L. Rev. 517 (2001).
319. !d. at 517. The "three-legged stool" analogy used by Finan and Williams echoes the
sentiments of some legislators that the author has spoken with. William Batchelder, former Speaker
Pro Tempore of the Ohio House of Representatives, highlighted the synergistic effects of an activist
court and legislative term limits. "The legislature in Ohio has traditionally exercised quite a bit of
power. ... But with the Ohio Supreme Court expanding the scope of its authority ... and with
legislative term limits ... the legislature's clout has been diminished." Telephone Interview with
William Batchelder, supra n. 116.
320. See Finan & Williams, supra n. 318, at 522-528.
321. Owsiany, supra n. 9, at 555 (arguing that it may be appropriate for the General Assembly
to remove judges who systematically overreach judicial authority).

83]

DEROLPH V. STATE

127

separation of powers. 322 That professor also considered an impeachment
of sorts by the taxpayers: "Resnick, who wrote the majority opinion, is up
for re-election this fall; certainly her judicial activism is a legitimate issue
in the campaign." 323

A.

The Price of Activism?

The majorities in DeRolph I and II consisted of two Republicans,
Justices Andrew Douglas and Paul Pfeifer, and two Democrats, Justices
Francis Sweeney and Alice Robie Resnick. For several years the Ohio
Supreme Court had also been deciding cases against business interests by
the same four-to-three majority. 324 In 1999, Justice Resnick wrote for this
majority in a controversial tort reform case, Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, where the Court struck down a tort reform statute
that placed caps on punitive damage awards. 325
The Sheward majority invoked the separation of powers arguments
that it had all but ignored in the DeRolph cases, and based its decision on
the curious premise that state courts alone have the exclusive right to
make tort law. 326 Resnick stated that caps on tort recovery were
unconstitutional because they violated citizens' rights of due process, and
that the limits themselves were "unreasonable and arbitrary." 327 Chief
Justice Moyer found Resnick's language to be inflammatory and
accusatory, as well as unwarranted and inappropriate. 32 H This case
solidified business opposition to the DeRolph majority, and all but
ensured that judicial elections in Ohio would become more politicized
than ever before.
Ohio Supreme Court justices are elected in contested but
nonpartisan races for six-year terms. 329 The costs of such campaigns are
steadily increasing nationwide, 330 and these increases are not limited to
322. See Mayer, supra n. 202, at 9A.
323.

Id.

324. Roy A. Schotland, Financing judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. Rev.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849,870 (2001 ).
325. See Ohio A cad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
326. See id. at 1086, 1097; Owsiany, supra n. 9, at 554.
327. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1095.
328. Id. at 1114 (Moyer, C.j., dissenting) (stating that Resnick's accusatory language has "no
place in an opinion of this court").
329. These "nonpartisan" candidates are typically chosen in party primaries, and then appear
on the ballot for the general election without mention of party affiliation.
330. Kara Baker, Student Author, Is justice For Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio judicial
Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35
Akron L. Rev. 159, 159 (2001) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent judiciary: The
Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in judicial Elections, 74 Chi.- Kent L. Rev. 133, 136
(1998)).
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expenditures by the candidates themselves. 331 Interest groups frequently
run issue ads which do not explicitly recommend a vote for or against a
candidate, but whose message is often clear. Despite the high costs
involved in some judicial races, such advocacy has become very popular
because it is a less expensive means of influencing policy than the
alternatives available to interest groups. Although some commentators
have been critical of this approach, 332 the use of issue ads does not imply
any impropriety on the part of a candidate or the groups that implicitly
support that candidate's election. Groups often need only to elect an
honest judge with the desired judicial temperament in order to achieve
their goals. Following a series of controversial cases, most notably
Sheward, many hoped for a less activist temperament on the Ohio
Supreme Court.
B.

Campaign 2000

Increasing sentiment against judicial activism became more
apparent, and more important to judicial elections, over the course of the
DeRolph litigation. Republican maverick Paul Pfeifer retained his party's
nomination in 1998, but Democrat Ron Suster received strong support
from the business community, including the Ohio Chamber of
Commerce. 333 Despite this opposition, however, Pfeifer easily won
reelection. 334 "We will continue to operate," lamented one political
activist, "in an atmosphere marked by judicial activism." 335
When Justice Alice Robie Resnick ran for reelection in 2000, probusiness groups, concerned with the prospect of future cases like
Sheward, had another opportunity to impact judicial elections. In the
race between Resnick and Terrence O'Donnell, a number of issue-based
groups voiced opposition to Resnick, and ultimately spent significantly
more money on the campaign than did the candidates themselves. 336 In
f~Kt, outside expenditures outpaced the candidates' spending by a margin

331. Id. at 159-60 (citing jason Miles Levien & Stacie 1.. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections:
b:amining the First Amendmcm Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 Mich. L. & Policy
Rev. 71 (1997)).

332. See e.g. Schotland, supra n. 324, at 865 (criticizing the use of issue ads in judicial
campaigns).
333. Mark A. Hoftinan, Pro-Business Outlook Dims: Clinton Quick to Push for New Patients'
Rights Bill, Business Insurance I (Nov. 9, 1998).
334. David jacobs, GOP Keeps Majority, Dayton Daily News SA (Nov. 4, 1998). Pfeifer received
more than 71% of the vote in the general election. Hoffman, supra n. 333, at I.
335.

Hoffman, supra n. 333, at I.

336. Sec T.C. Brown, 2 Campaigns for Top Court Exceed $6 Million: Spending, Attack Ads Some
of the Worst in Country, Plain Dealer B I (Dec. 27, 2000).
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of approximately five-to-one, 337 with the first radio ads run against
Resnick in November 1999, a full twelve months before the general
election. 338 Resnick faced strong opposition from a number of groups,
including the Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 339 The Chamber of
Commerce in particular was worried that the Ohio Supreme Court's
decisions were having a deleterious effect on Ohio's tax rates and tort
law, and were thereby inflicting long-term harm on the state's
economy. 340
The most well-known anti- Resnick ad first ran on October 11, 2000,
and asked, "Is justice for sale in Ohio?" 341 The ad depicted Lady Justice,
with someone dumping money onto one side of the scales. 342 She peeked
from behind the blindfold and tipped the scale toward the money, as a
voice informed viewers that Justice Resnick had received over $750,000
from personal injury lawyers. 343 Some ads, moreover, were educationspecific. One depicted students "fooling around in an unattended
classroom." 344 A voice told viewers that Justice Resnick had "blocked the
legislature's effort to ensure that teachers spend more time in the
classroom." 345 As the voice informed viewers that the decision had been
overturned, the view changed to a classroom where students listened
attentively to their teacher. "Today in Ohio," claimed the ad, "instructors
teach and students learn, in spite of Alice Robie Resnick." 346
National groups ran similar ads, including one in which a female
judge changed her vote in favor of a plaintiff after someone dumped a

337. Resnick and O'Donnell raised $793,132 and $1,116,994, respectively. Schotland, supra n.
324, at 875 n. 126. By way of comparison, non-candidates were estimated to have spent from $8-12
million on the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court races. See id. at n. 128. See also Randy Ludlow, justice
Resnick Survives TV Ad Salvos, Cincinnati Post 15A (Nov. 8, 2000) (stating that at times Resnick and
O'Donnell "appear[ed] to be little more than underfunded spectators in their own campaigns").
338. joe Hallett, Editorial, High Court Race Conjurs Low Blows, Columbus Dispatch 3B (Apr. 2,
2000).
339. The Chamber, whose primary purpose is to present the business perspective on issues,
also aims to create a business climate responsive to economic expansion and growth. See
http:/ /www.ohiochamber.com (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
340. Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Tort Reform Decision "Blacklists" Ohio Business Climate,
Press Release, Aug. 16, 1999, available at http://www.ohiochamber.com/ Events/news_tort81699.asp
(Aug. 16, 1999).
341. Darrel Rowland & james Bradshaw, State Elections Panel Reaffirms Legality of AntiResnick TV Ad, Columbus Dispatch 1D (Oct. 27, 2000).
342. Baker, supra n. 330, at 162.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 163 (citing Spencer Hunt, Campaign 2000: Anti-Resnick Ad Pulled, Replaced,
Cincinnati Enquirer B2 (Oct. 25, 2000)).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 159 (citing http://www.ohiochamber.com/court/index.html (accessed Feb. 10,
2001)).
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pile of cash on her desk. 347 Such advertisements were among the
strongest examples of a national trend toward outside expenditures in
judicial campaigning. This was not, however, even the first time that
Justice Resnick herself had been the subject of such ads. In a prior race,
an ad against Resnick read: "On the Ohio Supreme Court, one justice has
a problem. It's money ... [from] the plaintiff lawyers who sue, sue, sue.
Over $300,000 from just them .... [This group] wants Resnick with her
liberal rulings to make it easier for them to collect millions in fees." 348
With so many ads being run by interest groups, the candidates' own
campaigns seemed almost secondary. Terrence O'Donnell, for his part,
did not support the campaigning by non-candidates. "I want to run a
positive campaign. I have not spoken negatively about my opponent." 349
O'Donnell was never given the opportunity. The Lady Justice ad
backfired and, in the words of Chief Justice Moyer, "guaranteed election
of the person it was designed to defeat." 350 So much negative attention
was focused toward Justice Resnick that a backlash of support carried her
to an easy election night victory_3 51

VII. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: DEROLPHS III AND
IV

While Alice Robie Resnick was fighting to continue her career as a
justice, Governor Taft and the General Assembly were working to meet
the mandates of DeRolph II. Lawmakers were becoming increasingly
frustrated, however, by the lack of a more specific definition of "thorough
and efficient." In spite of its efforts, the Ohio Supreme Court had offered
little guidance as to what specific changes lawmakers would need to make
in order to bring the system into compliance with the Court's rulings. 352

34 7. See id. at 165-66.
348. Charles D. Clausen, The Long and Winding Road: Political and Campaign Ethics Rules for
Wisconsin judges, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1999).
349. James Bradshaw, O'Donnell Laments Secret Ads, Columbus Dispatch 1B (Oct. 24, 2000).
350. Chief justice Pursues, Understands Difficulties of judicial Election Reforms, 69 Gongwer
News Service, Ohio Rep., Report No. 235 (Dec. 11, 2000).
351. Mike Wagner, Despite Negative Ads, Resnick Retains Seat, Dayton Daily News !A (Nov. 8,
2000).
352. Legislators and executive policymakers alike have voiced this concern. See e.g. Telephone
Interview with Arlene Setzer, supra n. 220 (stating that even after four cases the Ohio Supreme Court
has never offered a complete definition of "thorough and efficient"); Telephone Interview with Paulo
DeMaria, supra n. 208 (stating that the Governor's office is not entirely sure "what it means to
comply with DeRolph"). Clear guidance has also not been forthcoming from the Coalition, which has
rebuked mediation and other discussions of specific financial deals in lieu of the much vaguer
"complete systematic overhaul" requirement of DeRolph I.
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Although many legislators disagreed with the Court over the school
finance system's adequacy, and some found the "thorough and efficient"
standard hopelessly vague, most were nonetheless willing to make the
changes they thought were necessary to bring the system into
compliance. As one Senate aide noted, "The General Assembly was
frustrated that we could not seem to appease the Court ... [but] we were
willing to make serious changes to the funding formula." 353
Meanwhile, Governor Taft continued to promote his own policy
proposals (such as the "OhioReads" program) aimed at alleviating the
root causes of low educational attainment. Taft also sought
improvements in those areas where the Court had supported earlier
reforms, such as repair and construction of facilities and increased
funding of parity aid to low-wealth school districts. 354 House Bill 640,
signed on June 15, 2000, provided an additional $1.1 billion for school
construction. 355 Senate Bill 272, which became law the same day,
accelerated funding to urban districts, provided permanent funding to
districts with funding levels below the fiftieth percentile, and provided
assistance for districts that suffer a natural disaster. 356 Senate Bill272 also
established a procedure whereby districts could seek an Ohio Schools
Facilities Assessment of their needs. 357
Perhaps most importantly, the biennial budget bill changed the
formula for determining the level of basic aid, raising the base level to
$4,814 per pupil in fiscal year 2002, with increases of 2.8% every year
thereafter. 358 Such changes would be enough to reconfigure the majority
of the Ohio Supreme Court, whose membership had remained
unchanged but whose alliances had begun to waiver.

A.

DeRolph III: A Reversal of Fortune?

Pursuant to its order in DeRolph II, the Ohio Supreme Court heard
arguments again in June 2001. The Coalition argued that the State had
simply repackaged the system that the Court had rejected in DeRolph I
and DeRolph II. 359 "Local property taxation continues to be a hallmark of

353. Email from Marianne White, supra n. 207.
354. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208.
355. See Ohio Substitute H. 640, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2000).
356. See Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 272, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2000).
357. Id.
358. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1191.
359. Br. of Pis. Appellees at I, De Rolph III, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) (No. 99-0570)
(arguing that the state had merely "offered the Court yet another warmed-over version of the same
structurally flawed system already twice rejected"), available at http:/ /www.bricker.com (accessed
jan. 10, 2005).
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Ohio's school funding system," the plaintiffs stated, "together with the
educational disparities that inevitably flow from that reliance." 360 Thus
the Coalition, in response to its frustration with Governor Taft's and
General Assembly's efforts, asked the Ohio Supreme Court to take the
extreme measures of ordering the legislature to spend additional money
on specified programs; issuing contempt citations against recalcitrant
legislators; and ordering the State Treasurer to pay funds out of the State
treasury to the plaintiffs. 361
On September 6, 2001, a majority consisting of two justices from the
original DeRolph majorities (Justices Douglas and Pfeifer) and two
original dissenters (Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Stratton) held that
the State's funding system was still unconstitutional. 362 The new majority
emphasized, however, that many of the changes made in the 1990s had
begun to take effect, and that the system was on its way to becoming
thorough and efficient. 363 The Court then ordered the State defendants to
alter the methodology for determining the per pupil base cost and to
accelerate the phase-in of parity aid. 364 The Court stated that once its
directives were fulfilled the funding scheme would become
constitutional. 365
Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, writing for the majority, readily
admitted that DeRolph III was born of compromise. "None of us is
completely comfortable with the decision we announce," he stated, "[but]
no one is served by continued uncertainty and fractious debate." 366 The
decision was both controversial and divisive-between them, the seven
members of the Court wrote the majority opinion, three concurrences,
and three dissents.
The new four-justice majority relied heavily on the new base cost
formula, which had been altered in House Bill 94 to increase the base
amount to $4,814. 367 The most significant aspect of this formula was the
fact that it funded the full amount immediately, without a phase-in
period. 368 House Bill 94 adopted a charge-off rate of 23 mills, and
continued to offer gap aid to districts that were not able to fund their
local share of the base cost amount. 369 Importantly, gap aid also applied
360. Id. at 2.
361. Id. at 48.
362. DeRolph III, 754 N.F..2d at 1200.
363. Id.
364. I d.
365. Id. at 1201.
366. Id. at 1189-90.
367. Jd.at1191.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1192.
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to special education, vocational education, and transportation costs, so
that no district could be required to pay more than an additional 3 mills
for their share of such programs. 370 Gap aid thus addressed the problem
of phantom revenue by contributing additional funding to districts
where the tax base did not increase at the same rate as increases in base
cost.37I
The DeRolph III majority also noted the improvements made by the
addition of parity aid by the State. Eligible districts received funding to
make up the difference between what they could raise on 9.5 mills and
what the district at the eightieth percentile in income-adjusted wealth
could raise. 372 This helped low-wealth districts spend funds on
discretionary items in the same manner as wealthier districts.
Importantly, parity aid was not dependent on local tax effort. A district
would receive parity aid when it fell below the eightieth percentile,
regardless of its willingness to generate additional funding. 373 The
majority found that the combination of the new base cost formula, gap
aid, parity aid, and millage caps had established a system that, once
changed in accordance with the mandates of the Court's opinion, would
reduce reliance on local property taxes to a constitutionally permissible
level. 374
In its discussion of facilities, the DeRolph III majority considered
whether the legislation enacted in response to DeRolph IJ would, once
fully implemented, likely bring facilities into compliance within a
reasonable time frame. 375 The Court noted that the State had allocated
nearly $2.7 billion to this effort since 1998, and that the General
Assembly had enacted accelerated programs for urban schools and
exceptional needs programs for low-wealth districts. 376 In addition,
Senate Bill 272 required the State to make facilities assessments within
two years of a district's request. 377 The State had set comprehensive
guidelines for funding facilities and was doing so in a manner the Court
found acceptable. Furthermore, unlike the record of DeRolph I, which
showed a system in which many districts were "starved for funds," the
record of DeRolph III revealed a system in which deprivation was a rarity,

370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1193.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1199.
375. Id. at 1193-94.
376. Jd.at1194.
377. !d. at 1195.
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rather than the norm. 378 Last, the majority noted with approval the
academic standards established by Senate Bill 1 in January 2001. 379
Among the bill's provisions was a requin.:ment that academically failing
districts receive state review and assistance, including additional
funding. 380 The Court found that because of such provisions, "Ohio
schools are already improving." 381
In an extraordinary move that angered the dissenters and stretched
the limits of judicial authority, the DeRolph III majority specified several
changes that had to be made by the General Assembly before the system
would become constitutional. First, the Court stated that the base cost
formula must be modified to include the richest and poorest 5% of
districts, whose exclusion from the State's formula had resulted in a
lower base cost. 382 Second, the State calculated its base cost using either
inflation-adjusted spending data from 1996, or actual expenditures for
1999, whichever was lower. The majority stated that there was no
legitimate purpose behind this system, and held that the State could no
longer use the lower base amount. 383 Last, the Court held that in order to
be constitutional, the parity program had to be fully funded by the
beginning of fiscal year 2004, rather than 2006 as the State had
planned. 384 According to the Court, the system would be constitutional
once these mandates were met. Because the Court had "no reason to
doubt defendants' good faith," it relinquished jurisdiction in the case. 385
This holding drew furious dissents from Justices Resnick, Sweeney,
and Cook, for quite different reasons. They each argued, separately, that
the majority's decision overstepped the separation of powers and
constituted impermissible judicial lawmaking. 386 Justice Cook also
continued to argue that the entire series of DeRolph cases presented a
nonjusticiable political question. 387 Justice Sweeney remained
378. See Id. at 1196 ("The record before us today is very different ... These complaints simply
do not equate to deprivation of an opportunity to receive a basic education.").
379. Id. at 1197.
380. I d. at 1197-98.
381. Id. at 1198.
382. ld. at 1200.
383. Id. at 1200-01.
384. Id. at 120 I.
385. Id.
386. See id. at 1239 (Resnick, )., dissenting) ("[I]t is tempting to do what the majority has
done ... [but) that is not the prerogative of the judiciary."); id. at 1241 (Sweeney,)., dissenting) ("!
find it incredible that the majority takes it upon itself to make unconstitutional legislation
constitutional."); id. at 1245 (Cook, )., dissenting); ("The majority has made an initial policy
determination that the judiciary is ill equipped to make and that is characteristic of nonjusticiability.").
387. Id. at 1244 (Cook,)., dissenting).
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unconvinced that the State had fulfilled the mandate of DeRolph I to
overhaul the school finance system. He argued that the system was, at its
core, the same as it was when the case was filed: inadequate and overreliant on local property taxes. 388 Justice Resnick also decried what she
viewed as an ongoing over-reliance on local property taxes; an
inadequate basic aid formula; a lack of facilities funding; and the
continued presence of unfunded mandates and forced borrowing. 389
Resnick sharply criticized the majority for relying on the good faith of the
defendants. "They have stamped 'new and improved,"' she stated
somewhat hyperbolically, "on a system that is neither." 390

***
Why did the Ohio Supreme Court do what it did in DeRolph III? "If I
knew that," says Coalition Executive Director William Phillis, "I would
be writing a book. I think a lot of people in the statehouse would like to
buy that book as well." 391 Most likely, the DeRolph III decision was
exactly what Chief Justice Moyer said it was-a compromise between the
Court's moderate and conservative Republicans designed to bring the
case to a halt. Although Moyer had indicated in DeRolph I and DeRolph
II that he thought Ohio's school funding system was constitutional, in
DeRolph III he was willing to hold it otherwise, so long as the Court put
an end to the controversy by giving the legislature guidance as to what
changes to make. 392 Republican Justices Andrew Douglas and Paul
Pfeifer shifted in the opposite direction. They still believed that the
system was unconstitutional. Unlike the more liberal Justices Resnick
and Sweeney, however, they were willing to hold the system
constitutional if the State made the changes recommended in the
decision. 393 Thus, a new majority was formed, which upheld the core of
the first two decisions but nonetheless seemed to present a long-term
victory to the State defendants.
Neither the Coalition nor the State defendants were satisfied with the
Court's decision. The Coalition opposed DeRolph III because it seemed
to be a retreat from DeRolph Ts mandate of a "complete systematic
overhaul." According to William Phillis, "It would cost $1.2 billion to
change the methodology [in accordance with the DeRolph III decision],
38R. See id. at 1242 (Sweeney,)., dissenting).
389. See id. at 1231-32 (Resnick,)., dissenting).
390. Id. at 1217 (Resnick,)., dissenting).
391. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
392.

See De Rolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1201.

393. Id. at 1215 (Douglas,)., concurring) ("once modified, the new legislation will meet the
constitutional standard") (emphasis added).
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but this was not the systematic change that we had sought." 394 For their
part, legislative leaders were surprised by the specific holding in DeRolph
III, but had come to expect the Ohio Supreme Court to reject any system
put before it and had therefore shifted their focus from meeting the
Court's mandates toward promoting their own policy goals. As one
exasperated legislator told the author, "DeRolph III and IV were met with
a big yawn in the legislature." 395 Lawmakers also began to express
frustration with the Court's decision. Republican leaders felt that the
Court had ignored the important changes the State had made since
DeRolph I, 396 and many reiterated that money was not the solution to all
of the State's problems. 397 Perhaps more importantly, some legislators
questioned the Ohio Supreme Court's ability to impose a remedy. The
key question for many was not whether the system was unconstitutional,
but whether the Ohio Supreme Court had overstepped its institutional
bounds. Does the Court have the ability to create an obligation for the
legislature? Many lawmakers did not think so.
B.

DeRolph IV-The Real About-Face

The State of Ohio and other defendants immediately filed a motion
with the Ohio Supreme Court asking the Court to reconsider its holding
in DeRolph III. 398 Governor Robert Taft believed that the Court's
monetary value for adequate funding was based on flawed math. The
Court held in DeRolph III that the per pupil base cost formula "must be
modified to include the top five percent districts and the lower five
percent districts," thereby ordering the elimination of "wealth screens"
that excluded the wealthiest and poorest 5% of school districts from the
base cost formula. 399 The State now argued, however, that the use of

394. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
395. This legislator requested anonymity. Similar sentiments were expressed "off the record" by
a number of other policymakers also not cited in this article.
396. Telephone Interview with Arlene Setzer, supra n. 220 ("! think that the courts have
ignored the great strides that we have made.") (emphasis added).
397. Id. (noting that "funding is not the solution to everything"); Telephone Interview with
Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208 (stating that "the education issue is not simply about money," and
emphasizing the importance of accountability, early childhood education and curriculum
development).
398. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 535 (2002) (Moyer, C./., dissenting) [hereinafter
DeRolph Ill]. The state defendants filed for reconsideration on September 17, 2001, only 11 days
after the decision in DeRolph III was announced.
399. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1200. The term "wealth screen" refers to the practice of
excluding ("screening out") a number of school districts from the formula used to determine the per
pupil base funding cost. Prior to DeRolph JIJ, the state's formula screened out the top and bottom 5%
of all Ohio districts based on income and property wealth from the state's pool of 170 topperforming districts. This practice lowered the per pupil base funding amount by excluding wealthy
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wealth screens was necessary because inclusion of data from the top and
bottom 5% of districts had a dramatic effect and unreasonably distorted
the base cost calculation. 400
In support of its motion for reconsideration, the State provided the
Court with evidence that the use of wealth screens is standard practice
throughout school finance, and in any event was not an attempt to
artificially lower the final per pupil base cost. 401 This evidence included
testimony from a number of experts, including one of the witnesses for
the DeRolph plaintiffs. 402 This small change to the funding formula
represented a massive change in statewide funding-in DeRolph III the
Ohio Supreme Court had essentially ordered a $1.2 billion annual
funding increase. The State was already feeling the budgetary effects of an
economic downturn, and the difference in methodologies represented
hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funding.
On November 2, 2001, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to reconsider
its September 6 decision. Although Governor Taft wanted to address
only the issue of the base cost formula, the Court indicated that it would
reconsider the entire case. 403 Rather than immediately reconsidering its
holding, though, the Court also ordered a settlement conference between
the plaintiffs and the State defendants. 404
The mediation never got off the ground. For roughly three months in
early 2002, the parties argued not over the composition of the funding
formula, but rather over what issues the mediation should involve. 405 The
defendants wanted mediation limited to a few specific issues, particularly
the changes to the funding formula that the Court had required in
DeRolph III. The Coalition, on the other hand, hoped to use the
mediation process to discuss all of the points at issue in DeRolph I and
DeRolph II. The parties were generally unwilling to move from their premediation positions, and on March 21, 2002, the court-appointed master
commissioner, Howard Bellman, notified the Supreme Court that
mediation had not produced a resolution. 406 Howard Bellman had a
seemingly impossible task. The State appeared willing to compromise,
but it could not, while faced with a slow economy and a budget crunch,
districts from the funding ft)rmula.
400. Sec DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 540 (Moyer, C:.j., dissenting).
401. DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 540-41 (Moyer, C.j., dissenting).
402. /d. (Moyer, C.j., dissenllng).
403. See DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (2001).
404. ld. at 1113.
405. Telephone Interview with William Phillis, supra n. 6.
406. DcRolph IV, 7SO N.E.2d at 537 (Moyer, C.j., dissenting). Additional information on
mediation is by and large unavailable. The discussions themselves are confidential, and
representatives from both the Coalition and the state are generally unable to discuss details.
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act like it had a blank check.
The parties once again argued their case to the Ohio Supreme Court
in October 2002. On December 11, the Court did an about-face that was
perhaps even more surprising than DeRolph III. The majority from
DeRolph I and II reunited for a brief, relatively simple decision that
reinstated the key holding of DeRolph II but ended the courts'
jurisdiction in the DeRolph litigation. In a three-page opinion remarkably
lacking in factual or legal substance, Justice Paul Pfeifer unsuccessfully
sought to make sense of the majority's action. "We do not regret
[DeRolph III] .... However, upon being asked to reconsider that
decision, we have changed our collective mind. Despite the many good
aspects of DeRolph III, we now vacate it." 407 Pfeifer briefly lauded the
legislature's increases in school funding before reiterating the DeRolph I
requirement of a systematic overhaul of Ohio's education system. 408 The
Court's decision in DeRolph III notwithstanding, this burden had
apparently not been met.
Justice Douglas, whose vote made the majority, was reluctant. "I
would ... reaffirm our decision in DeRolph III with the exception of the
wealth-screening issue. There are not, however, four votes for that
approach." 409 Justice Resnick, on the other hand, exhorted the voters to
take the issue farther than the Court was permitted to do. Resnick
suggested that further litigation was inevitable, and that without a
constitutional amendment mandating an adequate per pupil funding
level the General Assembly would continue "fail[ing] to perform its
responsibilities." 410 Resnick even suggested adopting an amendment
specifying the funding formula and a specific per pupil amount. 411
The dissenters stayed a little more on topic. Justice Cook, citing her
DeRolph III dissent, simply reiterated that she would have dismissed the
case altogether. 412 Chief Justice Moyer offered the only recitation of facts
found in DeRolph IV and argued that the State presented compelling
evidence that the use of wealth screens was not merely desirable, but in
fact was scientifically necessary. He sharply criticized the majority for
turning DeRolph III on its head with little explanation and derided the
decision as "little more than a summary proclamation of a change of
'collective mind."' 413 Indeed, there seems to be little else in the decision

407. De Rolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.
408. See id.
409. Id. at 534 (Douglas, J., concurring).
410. See id. (Resnick,)., concurring).
411. Id. (Resnick,)., concurring).
412. See id. at 542-43 (Cook,)., dissenting).
413. Id. at 536 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
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that explains the Court's turnaround.
Although those involved in the litigation cannot fully explain the
Ohio Supreme Court's divergent holdings in DeRolph II, III, and IV, 414
the shift in DeRolph IV does fit within this author's explanation of
DeRolph III as a compromise. For Justices Pfeifer and Douglas, the State's
school funding syste!Cl had always remained unconstitutional. They had
agreed to Chief Justice Moyer's decision in DeRolph III as part of a
bargain, whereby they would hold the system constitutional only if the
State made specific changes, most notably altering the funding formula to
add roughly $1.2 billion of additional annual spending. The State did not
meet those terms, and because mediation failed the system remained (in
Pfeifer's and Douglas' opinion) in its unconstitutional pre-DeRolph III
condition. 415 By contrast, the more conservative ChiefJustice Moyer and
Justice Evelyn Stratton seemed to have agreed to DeRolph III solely to
bring an end to the controversy, so their position in DeRolph IV actually
better represents their true opinions of the merits of the case. 416
By the time DeRolph IV was decided, the case's importance to
legislative leaders had seemingly come and passed. The State had made
efforts to comply with the Ohio Supreme Court's holdings, but had long
since shifted its primary focus to such things as accountability, early
educational attainment, and stronger curricula. DeRolph IV therefore
met with relatively less concern from the General Assembly than had its
predecessors. According to one prominent legislator, "DeRolph makes up
very little of what the [Education] Committee does .... We have a lot of
issues to deal with, and not all of them stem from money." 417 Some also
express disappointment with the courts. "We simply do not know what
we can do to appease the courts other than to take over the entire
funding system and eliminate all local money, which we will not do." 418
1.

Campaign 2002

Perhaps the strangest turn in DeRolph IV was the Ohio Supreme

414. See supra n. 391 and accompanying text.
415. DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.
416. The remaining justices were somewhat more consistent throughout the DeRolph
litigation. justices Resnick and Sweeney consistently took a more activist approach than the rest of
the Court was willing to follow. justice Cook, meanwhile, steadfastly maintained that the entire case
was nonjusticiable from its very beginning.
417. Telephone Interview with Arlene Setzer, supra n. 220.
418. Email from Marianne White, supra n. 207. Other legislators and political scientists echo
these sentiments. The idea of operating the entire funding system statewide, moreover, has never
been seriously considered. "The power of suburban districts is strong in the legislature," noted
former Speaker Pro Tempore William Batchelder, "and high spending districts don't need state
money and don't want state control." Telephone Interview with William Batchelder, supra n. 116.
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Court's decision to release jurisdiction in the case. In DeRolph I and II,
the Court had taken the truly extraordinary step of retaining
jurisdiction, 419 essentially for the purpose of checking in on the
legislature's progress and forcing it to act. Yet in DeRolph IV, where the
Court simply reinstated the core of the prior holdings, it did no such
thing. This could have been the result of battle fatigue. The unhappy
compromise of DeRolph Ill had already demonstrated the justices' desire
to get DeRolph off their hands. It is also possible, however, that the
decision had something to do with the changing majority following the
2002 elections.
In November 2002, then-Lieutenant Governor Maureen O'Connor
was elected to replace the retiring maverick Republican Justice Andrew
Douglas on the Ohio Supreme Court. 420 O'Connor campaigned on
reversing the Court's increasingly activist trend, stating that as a justice
she would "respect the governor" and "leave policy debates where they
belong-in the legislature." 421
As the lieutenant governor, Maureen O'Connor enjoyed substantial
name recognition and was ahead in the polls by double digits throughout
the race. When election night concluded, the implications of O'Connor's
joining the Ohio Supreme Court were clear. "There is probably a new
majority, a new philosophy which cases will be tested against, and that is
judicial restraint," O'Connor told supporters on election night. 422 Justice
Stratton was even more emphatic: "[The majority] now will respect the
role of the court, not be activists; not render decisions ... that make
absolutely no sense." 423 There would soon be a new four-person majority
in Columbus-Chief Justice Moyer and Justices O'Connor, Stratton, and
Cook, all conservatives who believe in judicial restraint. 424 The old
419. See e.g. DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 535 (Lundberg Stratton, )., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("In no case other than DeRolph have we retained jurisdiction once we have made
a finding of unconstitutionality.").
420. See e.g. Laura A. Bischoff, Stratton, O'Connor Win Ohio Supreme Court Races, Cox News
Service (Nov. 6, 2002) (available at LEXIS, News library, Cox News Service file).
421. See Maureen O'Connor for Justice
com/philosophy.htm. (visited Apr.!, 2003).

Campaign,

at

http://www.oconnor4justice.

422. Bischoff, supra n. 420.
423. Id.
424. Id. Some observers have pointed out, however, that predictions of judicial temperament
often miss the mark. "Certainly she [O'Connor] would not have been given the Republican
nomination if there had not been the general perception that she would take conservative positions
on economic issues, including school funding. But as you're well aware, such perceptions sometimes
turn out to be wrong." Email from Lawrence Baum, supra n. 213. It is also worth noting that within
five months of justice O'Connor joining the Ohio Supreme Court, justice Deborah Cook was
confirmed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Tom Deamer, Senate Confirms
Cook to Appellate Court, Plain Dealer AS (May 6, 2003). Governor Taft filled the vacancy on the
Court with the appointment of Terrence O'Donnell. T.C. Brown, Tafi picks O'Donnell j(Jr Supreme
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majority knew this and decided to release jurisdiction over DeRolph.
VIII. ASSESSING THE DEROLPH LEGACY
It is important to put the DeRolph decisions in perspective. DeRolph I
and II did not, by way of comparison, suffer from many of the problems
that have plagued other states' school finance litigation. Such cases tend
to be dominated by two jurisprudential extremes: judicial activism and
judicial abdication. 425 Some state supreme courts have found school
funding to be a nonjusticiable political issue. 426 In doing so, they have
often abdicated their responsibility to provide adequate judicial
review. 427 Others have been so activist that the words of state
constitutions and the principle of deference to the legislature become
almost meaningless. 428 Although the Ohio Supreme Court's decisions in
DeRolph III and IV are difficult to explain, the Court successfully took a
more moderate approach in DeRolph I and II. In those cases, the Court
delineated the State's constitutional standard and applied that standard
to the factual record to hold the system unconstitutional. The Court
properly left the job of remedying the system to the legislature.
As this author has noted elsewhere, there are strong arguments
against judicial activism in school finance cases. 429 Finding a statewide
system of school finance unconstitutional may be the quintessential
example of judicial activism-it involves the least accountable branch of
government overruling the policies set not only by state and local
legislative bodies, but also by voters themselves. 430 School finance cases
also rely on novel legal precedent and inevitably lead to court
involvement in taxation issues. Even the courts themselves are often wary
to do this. 431
At the other extreme, however, some courts have declined to declare
education a fundamental right even though the relevant state's
Court Seal, Plain Dealer B1 (May 13, 2003). These events should not have much effect on the Ohio
Supreme Court's overall jurisprudence. Cook was, and O'Donnell is generally expected to be, among
the more conservative justices on the Court. Indeed, this appears to be one of the primary reasons
that O'Donnell was selected. "I was looking for a candidate," said Governor Taft, "who understood
and believed in the separation of powers of government." Id.
425. See generally Thro, supra n. 96; Obhof, supra n. 17.
426. See e.g. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996) (stating that
questions relating to the quality of education are solely for the legislative branch to answer).
427. Thro, supra n. 96, at 530.
428. Jd. at 532. See also supra nn. 14, 17.
429. See Obhof, supra n. 17, at 593-95.
430. Swenson, supra n. 4, at 1150.
431. See james C. Joslin, Student Author, Developing a School Funding Remedy for Ohio and
Beyond, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 1247, 1254 (1995).
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constitutional provisions suggest that it is. 432 Many courts have also
simply held that questions of educational quality are nonjusticiable. In
Coalition for Adequacy v. Chiles, for example, the Florida Supreme Court
stated, "Appellants have failed to demonstrate . . . an appropriate
standard for determining 'adequacy' that would not present a substantial
risk of judicial intrusion" into the powers of the other branches of
government. 433
Indeed, courts may not be competent to establish their own
educational standards. Courts are, however, not only permitted but also
required to apply a standard created by another branch. 434 That is the
very essence of judicial review. Illinois Supreme Court Justice Charles
Freeman made this point clear when he dissented in part from
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar. "Courts cannot exercise
legislative powers or compel their proper action. . . . However, 'the
judiciary has always had the right and duty to review all legislative acts in
the light of the provisions and limitations of our basic charter."' 435 A
court should be constrained by the limitations of its role. It should not,
however, abandon its duty to determine whether the legislature has
complied with the State's constitution. 436
DeRolph I and II illustrate a third, more moderate course of action.
The Ohio Supreme Court first asked whether the Ohio Constitution sets
a minimum standard of education, and found that it did. The Court then
looked to Miller v. Korns and Board of Education v. Walter to determine
what that standard was. Having decided that a system could not be
thorough and efficient if it was "starved for funds" or "lacked teachers,
buildings, or equipment," the Court then applied that standard to the
facts at hand. Although the Ohio Supreme Court held the State's funding
system unconstitutional on adequacy grounds, it also declined to fashion
a remedy, leaving that instead to the State legislature and governor. This
middle ground approach balanced the principles of judicial restraint and
judicial review.
The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently relied on many of the
same variables that other courts have focused on when deciding school
finance cases. These include disparities in interdistrict per pupil
432. Thro, supra n. 96, at 542.
433. Coalition for Adequacy v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court echoed these sentiments in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun by stating that finding for
plaintiffs would have been "far beyond the judiciary's constitutional powers or institutional
capacity." City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40,55 (R.I. 1995).
434. Thro, supra n. 96, at 547.
435. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1203 (Ill. 1996) (Freeman,)., dissenting
in part) (quoting Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 93, 132 N.E.2d 501 (1956)).
436. ld. at 1204 (Freeman,)., dissenting in part).
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spending, percentage of the tax burden placed on the local level as
opposed to statewide sources, and districts' ability to attract high quality
teachers and administrators. 437 Each of these factors played an important
role in the DeRolph decisions. 438
The example of Ohio is particularly unique because the DeRolph
Court was not making entirely new law. It was not required, like many
other states' courts have been, to attempt to define its state's education
provisions for the first time. The DeRolph Court applied the prior
interpretations of Ohio's Education Clause from Miller and Walter.
Those precedents implied that there is an adequacy standard in Ohio.
The Court applied this standard forcefully, but did so in a manner that
constrained the holding to an adequacy framework. Although the
plaintiffs brought the suit under both equity and adequacy-based claims,
the Ohio Supreme Court did not, as so many others have, require an
equity standard that was clearly beyond the scope of the State
constitution. 439 In fact, the Court specifically stated that it did not
support an equalizing "Robin Hood" approach. 440 This choice was wise
both as a legal and a pragmatic matter-it has allowed Ohio to avoid the
problems that have plagued equity states such as California. 441
In the first two rounds of the DeRolph battle, the Ohio Supreme
Court left broad discretion to the legislature to change the education
system. Unlike other states' courts, such as those in Kentucky and
Massachusetts, the Court recognized that there are limits to judicial
competence in the area of school finance. While the Court did order a
sweeping remedy, and probably overstepped its authority by retaining
jurisdiction, 442 it did not legislate its own remedy or establish strict and
unattainable guidelines. The Court wisely declined the opportunity to
instruct the General Assembly as to what type of legislation to enact. 443 It
chose instead to state which aspects of the system were unconstitutional,
explain the basis for its holding, and allow the General Assembly to fill in

437. Lundberg, supra n. 4, at 1109.
438. Some courts have paid particular attention to their state's average per pupil spending visa-vis the national average. As ChiefJustice Moyer pointed out in his dissents, however, Ohio ranked
highly in this category. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 787 (Moyer, C.)., dissenting).
439. I d. at 746.
440. Id.
441. See supra n. 82.
442. justice Cook was adamant about this point in a number of dissents. "I would modify the
order," she stated upon motion for clarification of DeRolph I, "by disposing altogether with any
continuing jurisdiction." DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ohio 1997) (Cook, )., dissenting).
'There is no case or controversy pending ... [and] the courts are not in the business of making new
laws." Id.
443. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747.
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the blanks. 444 Thus, despite being attacked for "legislating from the
bench," the DeRolph Court's first two decisions were relatively moderate.
As State Senator Jeff Jacobson, who later devised a finance plan that the
Court approved in DeRolph III, stated in April 2001, "I think that the
court was right in what they did .... [I]t was a very moderate decision ....
[I]t was not the type of decision that would lead itself to a constitutional
crisis and yet that's the way many people treated it." 445
The decisions in DeRolph III and IV are less defensible. Although
DeRolph III was designed specifically to end the dispute between the
plaintiffs and the State, it was a much stronger example of judicial
activism than the prior decisions. The Ohio Supreme Court not only held
the system unconstitutional, but also effectively required the General
Assembly to enact specific legislation as a remedy. Such
recommendations violated the separation of powers and were
constitutionally inappropriate. It is not the province of the courts to
order specific remedies when legislative responses are insufficient. The
role of the judiciary is merely to say what the law is and to direct other
public officials back to the proper course. 446 The Court's decision in
DeRolph III should not have dealt with such details as the use of wealth
screens in the base cost formula, except to find that the system as a whole
was not thorough and efficient. As Justice Resnick argued in dissent, "(I]f
the system is not thorough and efficient, this court should say so and
then . . . give the General Assembly additional time to craft a
constitutional system." 447 To take further action oversteps the Supreme
Court's role in the State's constitutional system.
It is important to note that courts generally lack not only the legal
authority but also the institutional competence to make policy
determinations in an area as complex as school funding. Merely defining
what constitutes an "adequate" education requires judges to go far
beyond their area of expertise, and has "spawned a huge industry of
competing expert witnesses, traveling from state to state, from one

444. See id.
44). DeRolph
Ifl,
754
N.E.2d
at
1215
(Douglas,
}.,
concurring)
(citing
http://www.capitolgate.com/OH/ prcssroom/leadstory.asp'id=35 and http://www.capitolgate.com
/OH/ pressroom/leadstory .asp id= I 09).
446. Thro, supra n. 96, at 528; see also Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, at 437
(Clinton Rossiter ed., New Am. Lib. 1961). Alexander Hamilton offered the classic argument against
judicial encroachment on the functions of the legislature and executive. The courts are to only say
what the law is, Hamilton argued, and not what it should be. "If [courts] should be disposed to
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequences would equally be the substitution of their
pleasure to that of the legislative body." Id. (emphasis in original).
447. IJcRolph IIl, 754 N.E.2d at 1239 (Resnick,}., dissenting).
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'adequacy' hearing to another." 448 There is also little reason to believe
that courts are either more in touch with the voters' views or more
capable of formulating sound public policy decisions than the other
branches of government. Additionally, courts frequently place too much
emphasis on money, and minimize the fact that not all education
problems stem from a lack of resources. One would hardly know from
reading most school finance decisions (including those by the various
DeRolph majorities) that there are actually significant empirical disputes
as to the importance of finance in the delivery of a quality education. 449
The Ohio Supreme Court's turnaround in DeRolph IV is also
questionable. The Court did a complete about-face in one of the most
important cases in the State's history-a case with significant budgetary
implications and a direct effect on nearly every student in Ohio's public
school system. The majority nevertheless found it unnecessary to explain
its reasoning, other than to say that some justices had "a change of
mind." For a case of such practical and constitutional import, one would
expect slightly stronger support than that. Such unexplained activism
perhaps explains why the General Assembly, which was rocked by the
first DeRolph decision, has now shifted its focus almost entirely towards
its own initiatives rather than the mandates of the Court.
The indirect effects of DeRolph on other parts of the State's budget,
particularly higher education, are certainly worth mentioning. "Each
time we added money to meet one of the decisions," notes an advisor to
Governor Taft, "we had to squeeze other parts of the budget." 450 A
comment from State Treasurer Joseph Deters captures both the positive
and negative aspects of this relationship. "The DeRolph case has
dramatically changed the way schools have been funded in our state, and
has been the catalyst for improving existing buildings and constructing
new schools all across Ohio. However, because no state has unlimited
resources . . . it has also had an impact on other areas of the state
budget." 451
Lawmakers and administrators alike suggest that higher education
has suffered because of the DeRolph cases. Universities' budgets have
seen limited growth, 452 and some have estimated that Ohio's higher
448. Richard Rothstein, Equalizing Education Resources on Behalj· of Disadvantaged Children,
Nat!. Commn. on Excellence in Educ., U.S. Dept. of Educ., in A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform31, 74-75 (1983).
449. This debate did, however, play a role in Chief justice Moyer's dissents to DeRolph I and II.
See supra n. 44.
450. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208.
451. Email from the office of joseph Deters, Treasurer of the State of Ohio, to Larry j. Obhof
(May 13, 2003) (copy on file with author) (emphasis added).
452. See Telephone Interview with Herb Asher, supra n. 205 (stating that although most areas
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education budget is as much as 10-15% lower than what it would have
otherwise been without DeRolph. 453 Job training programs have also
suffered, which may have indirectly lowered the State's income. 454 The
legislature seems determined to make these areas priorities in the next
decade, at least partly to compensate for the relative neglect that they
have experienced because of DeRolph. 455

A.

The Aftermath

Ohio's education system, though much improved over its preDeRolph state, is still in the process of reform. As a matter of basic case
law, the mandates of DeRolph I and II remained unfulfilled, and the
system is still unconstitutional. The Coalition plaintiffs remain strong in
their resolve and foresee future litigation. On March 4, 2003, the DeRolph
plaintiffs asked Judge Lewis to schedule and conduct a "compliance
conference" to address the State's compliance with DeRolph IV. The
plaintiffs also requested that the State be ordered to prepare a report
setting forth proposals to comply with the DeRolph decisions. 456 The
State immediately sought a writ of prohibition from the Ohio Supreme
Court to prevent Judge Lewis and the common pleas court from
exercising further jurisdiction in DeRolph. 457
On May 16, 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered Judge Lewis to
stop any proceedings in his court aimed at enforcing DeRolph IV. Justice
Stratton, writing for a five-justice majority, characterized the Coalition's
request for a conference as "nothing more than an ill-disguised attempt
to require judicial approval for proposed remedies even before those
remedies are enacted." 458 Such actions, she stated, were inconsistent with
DeRolph IV. "The duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy an
educational system," Justice Stratton concluded. "Judge Lewis and the
common pleas court patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over
any post-DeRolph IV proceedings, we now grant a peremptory writ and
end any further litigation in DeRolph v. State." 459
The Coalition quickly petitioned the United States Supreme Court
of Ohio's budget have grown significantly in recent years, funding for higher education has not).
453. Telephone Interview with William Batchelder, supra n. 116.
454. Jd. ("As factory training programs were cut, we lost skilled workers, which lowered the
future tax base and led to long-term losses in state income.").
455. In discussions with the author, most lawmakers have also emphasized the importance of
Medicaid-which is the fastest-growin;; part of the state's budget-as well as other social services.
456. Telephone Interview with Matt DeTemple, supra n. 111.
457. judge Lewis also petitioned the Supreme Court for guidance as to the proper course to
follow. See State ex rei. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio SUd 97, 100 (2003 ).
458. Jd. at 103 (emphasis in original).
459. Id. at 104.

83]

DEROLPH V. STATE

147

for a writ of certiorari. Its efforts were no doubt hampered by prior
Supreme Court precedent stating that education is not a fundamental
federal right and that the states are free to balance the values of local
control and equality of educational resources. 460 This forced the DeRolph
plaintiffs to find a different federal claim that would give the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to hear the case. They therefore asserted various
claims of denial of due process and equal protection, alleging that the
Ohio Supreme Court's refusal to assure compliance with its remedial
orders effectively denied the plaintiffs their right of access to the courts.
They argued, in essence, that "Lewis' denial of Petitioner's federallyprotected right of access to Ohio's courts works a complete deprivation
of the remedy to which DeRolph IV entitles Petitioners." 461
The State sharply criticized this approach, arguing not only that the
petition raised no federal claims, but also that the Coalition clearly had
not been denied access to the courts, as it had in fact used them
effectively and had won all of the preceding lawsuits. 462 The State also
disparaged what it saw as an ongoing attempt by plaintiff~ to federalize
virtually all state law issues. "In our federalist system, public education
has long been the province of state and local government. . . . [T]he
Court ought not to stretch due process principles to create federal
oversight over whether a State's educational system is 'thorough and
efficient."' 463 The United States Supreme Court agreed with the State on
at least one of the points-it unanimously rejected the petition on
October 20, 2003. 464 It thus appears that the DeRolph saga is definitively
over. Any future court actions will have to take place under the aegis of a
different lawsuit.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It is too early to tell what the long-term effects of DeRolph v. State
will be. The DeRolph litigation has undeniably benefited a great many
students. When the case was brought in 1991 there was no known
adequate level of per pupil education funding in Ohio. The State had not

460. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that education is
not a fundamental right, and upholding an unequal school funding scheme under a rational basis
review).
461. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, DeRolph v. Ohio, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003) (No. 03·245),
available at http:/ I www.bricker.com (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
462. Br. of the Respondent at 2, DeRolph v. Ohio, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003) (No. 03-245) ("They
had their day in court; indeed, they had their decade in court. ... [T]hey won repeatedly") (emphasis
in original), available at http:/ /www.bricker.com (accessed jan. 10, 2005).
463. Id. at 28-29.
464. DeRolph v. Ohio, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003).
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even tried to determine such costs since the early 1970s. Despite having a
respectable per pupil average funding level, Ohio was also marked by
large disparities. The Ohio Supreme Court's holding in DeRolph IV
notwithstanding, the State now has a rational formula for determining
the cost of a basic education, and has programs in place to fund those
costs. Ohio also now has programs in place to even out the disparities
caused by the property tax system. While disparities will always exist,
underprivileged children today have a much greater chance of getting a
quality education than they did in 1991 or even 1998.
When DeRolph v. State was filed, some of Ohio's school districts
faced such substandard conditions that they were compared to the world
of Oliver Twist. The trial court's record for DeRolph I demonstrated that
some districts were forced to ration even the most basic supplies,
including such necessities as toilet paper and textbooks. 465 The Ohio
Supreme Court has remained strong in its resolve; the legislature and the
governor have responded by increasing funding and instituting
important academic reforms. As Chief Justice Thomas Moyer has
pointed out, the dire circumstances outlined in the initial trial court
decision have mostly disappeared. Far from the earlier complaints of
sewage-covered baseball fields and arsenic-laced drinking water,
plaintiffs now speak of advanced placement courses and different classes
having to share rooms. 466 Does this mean that school funding in Ohio is
perfect? Certainly not-but it does mean that significant progress has
been made since the courts first heard the DeRolph case.
The question now facing Ohio is whether the State can sustain the
commitment it has made to education. In early 2003, a budget crisis
caused by economic recession led to significant cuts in education
spending. 467 These cuts even provoked a lawsuit of their own, wherein
parents and superintendents challenged the governor's ability to decrease
funding for primary and secondary education. The case was quickly
dismissed, however, as a four-justice majority summarily upheld the
governor's constitutional authority to make cuts to the education
budget. 468 Despite their victory in court, the legislature and governor
ultimately remedied these short-term decreases and increased education

465.

DeRolph Ill, 754 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing DeRolph l, 677 N.E.2d at 744).

466. Id.
467. Governor Taft and the General Assembly were f()rced to cut the overall statewide budget
by roughly $300 million in january 2003, and cut primary and secondary education spending by
about $100 million. Telephone Interview with Paulo DeMaria, supra n. 208; see also A Disaster j(Jr
Urban Schools, Plain Dealer B8 (Feb. 21, 2003); William Hershey, House Backs Senate Budget:
Unhappy Taft says Education Cuts Due, Dayton Daily News Ill (Feb. 26, 2003).
468. See State ex rei Christopher v. Taft, 7R7 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio 2003).
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spending by more than 5% for the next fiscal year. 469 Unfortunately, they
had to raise taxes substantially in order to do so, 470 and efforts to rescind
the new taxes were well underway by the end of the year. 471
Ohio's leaders have made commendable changes to the State's school
finance system. Though not without its faults, Ohio's school system is
vastly improved from its pre-DeRolph state. Can Ohio continue down the
path it began in the mid -1990s, and fully fund such things as special
education, advanced placement courses, and modern technological
education? These are important problems, and we must hope that the
State's leaders are up to the task. We can no doubt be thankful, though,
that the dismal situation described by the Perry County trial court in
1994 has become a remnant of the past.

469. Lee Leonard, Taft Signs $48.8 Billion Budget Bill, Columbus Dispatch 1D (June 27, 2003).
470. These included a one-cent sales tax increase, which was used primarily to meet the state's
obligations to other areas, such as Medicaid and essential government services. See id.; see also Lee
Leonard, More Taxes, More Spending, Columbus Dispatch 1C (July 27, 2003).
471. The largest and most organized effort to repeal the state's tax increases was led by Ohio's
Secretary of State, j. Kenneth BlackwelL Blackwell and the group Citizens for Tax Reform obtained
more than 90,000 citizens' signatures in an attempt to force the state legislature to reconsider the
issue or, alternatively, to place the issue of repealing the tax on the November 2004 ballot. See
Blackwell Breaks with Party Line, Mansfield News journal4A (Oct. 14, 2003); Lee Leonard, Blackwell
Initiative; Petitions to Repeal Tax Fall Short, Columbus Dispatch lA (reb. 13, 2004).

